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ABSTRACT: What is the legal significance of regret following a reproductive
decision or outcome? In Gonzales v. Carhart, a Supreme Court majority
offered one answer to this question, famously invoking the regret of some
women for their past abortions as a reason to uphold a federal law criminalizing
a particular abortion procedure. But Gonzales is not the first case to confront
what I call "reproduction and regret," and the Court's approach in Gonzales
ignores the contrasting judicial responses from these other cases.
This Article supplies the missing analysis-contextualizing Gonzales's
treatment of reproduction and regret by identifying and developing five
additional models. These additional models come from disputes about adoption
surrenders, the performance of surrogacy arrangements, support obligations
arising from children born of unplanned pregnancies, the use of previously
frozen embryos, and the status of sperm donors. Each model depicts a different
understanding of reproduction and regret, supplementing Gonzales and the
ensuing commentary on that case with a more expansive inquiry into the work
courts have used regret to perform and the unarticulated assumptions or
normative commitments that might explain the doctrinal and rhetorical
inconsistencies. This wider lens illuminates regret's regulatory function across
the range of cases.
This Article's examination of regret as a regulatory tool in turn has three
analytical payoffs. First, it disrupts Gonzales's depiction of regret as a natural
and self-generated emotion, clarifying the role of the state in producing regret.
Second, it reinforces the critiques of Gonzales's use of maternal stereotypes
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with a more robust account of gender that not only includes stereotypes of
fatherhood but also exposes a specific link among regret, heterosexual
intercourse, and unexamined beliefs about sexual pleasure. Finally, it highlights
deep policy rifts in family law, a field that continues to prioritize the regulation
of sex in particular, despite rhetoric to the contrary.
The importance of the jurisprudence of reproduction and regret transcends
the particular disputes that exemplify it. As a general matter, contemporary
family law celebrates what the Supreme Court has called "the private realm of
family life" and scholars have called "the republic of choice." This vision not
only puts a premium on individual decisionmaking; it also complicates the
question of what the legal significance of an actor's own second thoughts about
such decisions should be. An analysis of reproduction and regret thus offers a
window into family law's foundational values and contests writ large,
providing insights into the principles, themes, and clashes dominating family
law today.
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How should law respond to a woman's regret or second thoughts following
an abortion, about the surrender of a child for adoption, or about a surrogacy
agreement? How do these cases compare to those in which a genetic father
wishes he had never conceived, wants to destroy frozen embryos he previously
created, or seeks to be more than a sperm donor in the lives of children he
helped bring into being?
This Article explores the legal significance of regret following
reproductive decisions. Regret's legal salience in such cases poses a challenge
because contemporary family law celebrates what the Supreme Court has called
"the private realm of family life"' and scholars have called "the republic of
choice."2 This vision puts a premium on individual decisionmaking in family
and personal matters. In turn, it also complicates questions about the import of
an actor's own second thoughts or regrets following such decisions.
In Gonzales v. Carhart,3 a Supreme Court majority offered one response to
such questions, famously invoking the regret of some women for their past
abortions as a reason to reject a constitutional challenge to a federal law
criminalizing a particular abortion procedure.4 This case generated extensive
commentary, including widespread condemnation of the Court's explicit
paternalism and reliance on unalloyed gender stereotypes.
This Article, however, takes a different tack. It situates Gonzales on a
larger landscape, revealing regret's legal traction in this particular opinion as
just one point on a continuum. It does so by identifying in case law, largely
predating Gonzales, a range of contrasting treatments of what I call
"reproduction and regret" and exploring the variations found in disputes about
adoption surrenders, the performance of surrogacy arrangements, support
obligations arising from children born of unplanned pregnancies, the
disposition of previously frozen embryos, and the status of sperm donors. The
Gonzales majority's blinders caused it to treat the problem of reproduction and
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
2. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 27
(1990); Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559 (1991).
3. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
4. Id. at 159 ("While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained," citing Brief for Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and 180
Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (No. 05-380)).
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regret as a new and isolated issue, even though other courts had confronted it
before in several different settings.5
Using five case studies in addition to Gonzales, this Article uncovers in
each a different understanding of reproduction and regret, supplementing
Gonzales and the ensuing commentary with a more expansive inquiry into what
work courts have used regret to perform and what unarticulated assumptions or
normative commitments might explain the doctrinal and rhetorical variations.
This wider lens illuminates regret's regulatory function across the range of case
studies. Understanding regret as a regulatory tool in turn has three analytical
payoffs.6 First, it disrupts Gonzales's depiction of regret as a natural and self-
generated emotion, clarifying the role of the state in producing regret and in
using regret to transfer power from the individual to the state. Second, it
reinforces the critiques of Gonzales's use of maternal stereotypes with a more
robust account of gender; this richer and more nuanced account not only
includes stereotypes of fatherhood but also exposes a specific link among
regret, heterosexual intercourse, and unexamined beliefs about sexual pleasure.
Finally, this analysis highlights deep policy rifts in family law, a field that
continues to prioritize the regulation of sex in particular, despite expressions to
the contrary.
Taken together, these insights reveal how courts' conceptualizations and
uses of regret in reproductive settings often embrace familiar but outdated
scripts about gender, sex, autonomy, and family, anchoring these constructions
all the more firmly in law. Indeed, although representing only a narrow slice of
family law, cases about reproduction offer a window into the field's
foundational values and its contests writ large.7  Thus, according to
5. The analysis in this Article focuses on the Court's failure to consider judicial treatments of regret
in cases about various reproductive decisions. Other critiques note the Court's failure to consider
relevant learning from additional sources, such as the "elaborate body of psychological research that
describes the way regret actually operates." Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the
Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 881 (2008); see also Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren,
Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997, 2036-37 (2010) (acknowledging
Guthrie's critique).
6. See generally Abrams & Keren, supra note 5 (exploring ways in which law and emotions
scholarship might prove useful, including contributions to doctrinal and rhetorical improvements and the
illumination of the unacknowledged role of emotions in legal analyses).
7. The contemporary critique of "family law exceptionalism" challenges the very notion of family
law as separate field. Janet Halley offers the following definition of the term:
"Family law exceptionalism" (FLE) will be my term for the extremely broad range of
ideas and practices-legal, cultural, social, economic, ideological, aesthetic-that set
marriage, reproduction, the family, childhood, sexuality, the home (the list could go on)
aside from domains of life deemed to be more general, more political, more
international, more economic (and again the list could go on indefinitely).
Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20-21 (2011). For
additional elaboration, see, for example, Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in
Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010).
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contemporary accounts, American family law prizes several liberal values-
autonomy, pluralism, privacy, and gender equality.8 These values animate an
array of modern doctrines, from constitutional limits on state regulation of
family matters, including reproductive freedom, to no-fault divorce, the
abandonment of gender-based role assignments, and an elaborate web of child
support duties and enforcement procedures designed to keep dependency
private. Today, although acknowledging the dark side of intimate life, law
portrays family principally as a domain of personal liberty; 9 as a refuge from
state interference,10 standardization,'' and stereotyped identities; 12 and as a site
for self-definition and sexual intimacy,13  as well as for responsibilities
voluntarily1 4 and lovingly 5 assumed.
Cases about reproduction crystallize these values, themes, and clashes.
Accordingly, autonomy has received explicit and especially well developed
attention in such cases, with reproductive decisions identified as
8. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
(2004) (criticizing family law's emphasis on autonomy and the privatization of dependency); Peggy
Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1348,
1371 (1994) (rooting family liberty and pluralism in the history of slavery); David D. Meyer, The
Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527 (2000) (discussing family privacy); Laura A.
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 194-96 (2007) (citing emphasis on gender
equality); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 523
(1992) (noting the rejection of traditional gender roles); see also, e.g., Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers
in Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 226 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (examining trends in contemporary family law).
9. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see
also, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 8 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990) (explaining that the
rationale for unilateral no-fault divorce lies "in the ideal of marriage as a relationship characterized by
the continuing existence of a mutual loving commitment between the spouses"). On the dangers posed
by such autonomy and privacy, see, for example, Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the
Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933, 948-49 (1985) (describing one view of the
family as "a hell of oppression and brutality"); Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1633-35 (2004) (criticizing the failure of Lawrence's liberty and equality values to
address power imbalances and the risks of domestic violence).
10. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing the "private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter").
11. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
12. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
13. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning a state ban on same-sex sodomy and
the precedent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had upheld the constitutionality of such
laws).
14. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing constitutional protection for "the
freedom of choice to marry").
15. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (noting parents' "high duty" to prepare their
children for adult responsibilities and justifying parental authority over children based on law's
recognition "that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children"); cf.
GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 277-306 (enlarged ed. 1991) (positing the "altruist"
model of the family).
16. Sometimes individual members of a given family have conflicting interests, creating a clash of
policies and values. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 8, at 554-58; Jane Rutherford, Beyond Individual
Privacy: A New Theory ofFamily Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 627 (1987).
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quintessentially central to personal liberty, family privacy, and self-definition.' 7
Likewise, the rhetoric of "personal responsibility," with its focus on child
support obligations, initially achieved prominence in the development of
welfare reform efforts designed to combat "irresponsible reproduction"' 8 and
now provides the euphemism for one of two competing federally supported
programs of sex education.' 9 Finally, legal analyses of laws about reproduction
trace out a contested boundary between permissible sex-based classifications,
based on would-be "real differences," and impermissible distinctions, reflecting
and perpetuating gender stereotypes.20 Such disputes mark the current frontier
of family law's transition from a once deeply gendered set of rights and
responsibilities to an increasingly gender-neutral regime.21
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I examines Gonzales, its
understanding and treatment of reproduction and regret, and the difficulties
posed by this approach, including those identified by critics. To contextualize
what I call the "reproach model of regret" discernible in Gonzales, Part II
17. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
18. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)); Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339
(1996).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 713 (2011). Cf 42 U.S.C.A. § 710 (2011) (allotting funding for a separate
program for abstinence education).
20. Compare, e.g., Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1981) (plurality opinion)
(citing females' capacity to become pregnant as a difference justifying gender-based statutory rape
laws), and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62-68 (2001) (upholding different treatment of nonmarital
children born abroad of citizen fathers versus those of citizen mothers, because only mothers must be
physically present at birth), with Michael M., 450 U.S. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (finding
stereotypes underlying gender-based statutory rape laws), id. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding
"traditional attitudes" reflected in gender-based statutory rape laws), and Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 86
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (condemning the majority opinion for relying on "an overbroad sex-based
generalization"). Scholars have criticized the Court's understanding and treatment of "real differences."
For example, Sylvia Law writes:
The difficulty with [the Court's] approach is that a central justification for limiting the
use of explicit sex-based classifications is that they are not related to real differences
between men and women. By contrast, laws governing reproductive characteristics,
such as those prohibiting abortion or providing nutritional supplements for pregnant
women, may be precisely related to the individual characteristics of the people they
identify. The prevailing sex equality standard determines whether the sex-based
classification at issue actually is responsive to real diferences between men and
women and rejects classifications when there are no such differences. This standard
usually works in relation to explicit sex-based classifications because individual men
and women escape stereotypical sex roles. The escapees disprove the judgment about
men and women that motivated the explicit sex-based classification. However, because
there are no escapees from biology, no pregnant men, or women sperm donors, a
standard focusing solely on comparative equality does not provide a helpful tool for
evaluating laws governing ways in which men and women categorically, biologically
differ.
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1984) (emphasis
added).
21. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have To Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1199 (2010).
Reproduction and Regret
introduces five additional case studies, with each showcasing a different model
of regret and each providing a contrast to Gonzales. In these models, courts
deploy regret not for the purpose of reproach, as in Gonzales, but instead for
distinctive objectives that I describe in turn as redemption, resistance,
responsibility, reconsideration, and respect. Part III first explores what these
various models might have meant for the Gonzales Court and then takes a
closer look at three salient themes teased out from the models: (A) the
unacknowledged role of the state in constructing regret and, reciprocally, the
new practices and legal approaches that such constructions themselves have
prompted; (B) assumptions about gender, sex, and sexual pleasure, which both
operate as an engine for the legal uses of regret and also persist as a product
thereof; and (C) the deep policy conflicts in family law, including an abiding
but disavowed interest in the regulation of sex, that the various understandings
of regret help expose. Part IV briefly concludes.
1. GONZALES'S INVITATION
The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart22 changes in
several important ways the constitutional doctrine governing abortion
restrictions. 23  Yet, perhaps the majority's most provocative move is its
acceptance as true-and as justification for state protection-the asserted
likelihood that women will regret the abortions they have chosen, in turn
suffering psychological distress. As the Court explains in part:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.24
22. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
23. But see David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion
Law, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. I (contending that Gonzales had little impact on medical practice and
constitutional law).
24. 550 U.S. at 159 (citation omitted). These sentences are part of a longer passage:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has
for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well. Whether to have an abortion
requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. See Brief for
Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae. . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can
follow.
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to
disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining themselves to the
required statement of risks the procedure entails. From one standpoint this ought not to
be surprising. Any number of patients facing imminent surgical procedures would
prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive medical
2011] 261
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This reasoning released a torrent of disapproval, beginning with Justice
Ginsburg's incisive dissent,25 quickly followed by condemnation in the popular
press26 and then numerous and varied critiques in legal scholarship. Such
mostly negative reviews have highlighted, inter alia, the majority opinion's
paternalism, 27 its use of gender stereotypes, 28 its reliance on unfounded
generalizations, 29  its misuse of informed consent doctrine,30  its
misunderstanding of psychological learning,31 and its analytical overkill. 32
procedures become the more intense. This is likely the case with the abortion
procedures here in issue.
It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus
will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State. The State has an interest in
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she
allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn
child, a child assuming the human form.
It is a reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge
it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus
reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions. The medical profession,
furthermore, may find different and less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the
second trimester, thereby accommodating legislative demand. The State's interest in
respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal
systems, the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the
consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.
Id. at 159-60 (some internal citations omitted).
25. Id. at 169-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. E.g., Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2007; Jeffrey Toobin, Five to Four, THE NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35; see also Emily
Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007 (Magazine) (critically
examining the development of the argument presented to the Court before the Gonzales decision and
opinions were handed down).
27. E.g., Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making,
16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223 (2009); cf Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and
Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2008) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion] (arguing that some statutes
purportedly enhancing a woman's abortion decisionmaking will interfere with her choice by requiring
the delivery of emotionally laden messages); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism] (examining the case for
paternalism to correct for emotional bias).
28. E.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-
Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1688 (2008) ("Woman-protective antiabortion
argument is gender-paternalist in just the sense that the old sex-based protective labor legislation was. It
restricts women's choices to free them to perform their natural role as mothers.").
29. E.g., Ronald Turner, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Court's "Women's Regret" Rationale, 43
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 41 (2008) ("The language of the Court's opinion reveals and reflects an
asserted moral certainty and worldview based upon (in the Court's view) an inarguable premise and
conclusion about abortion and 'women.' . . . On that view, the individual woman's liberty rights and
interests are extinguished . . . .").
30. E.g., Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1559 (2008).
31. E.g., Guthrie, supra note 5.
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Scholars have examined Gonzales's reasoning through the lens of the emerging
field of law and emotion 33 and have drawn provocative parallels between the
majority's approach, on one hand, and now familiar feminist insights about the
effects of domestic violence and the difficulties underlying the conventional
legal treatment of consent, on the other. 34
Such responses identify problems with Gonzales that, for purposes of
analysis, can be organized under three different headings: the evidence cited in
the opinion, the meaning attributed to the term "regret," and the marshaling of
gender and autonomy to uphold an abortion restriction. A closer look at each
not only illuminates the commentary on Gonzales but also provides useful
signposts for the case studies that follow.
A. The Evidentiary Basis: Sandra Cano's Brief
In support of its generalization about regret, the opinion cites only a brief
by Sandra Cano,35 once known as Mary Doe, the plaintiff in Doe v. Bolton,36
the companion case to Roe v. Wade.n Both Cano and her more highly
publicized counterpart in securing a constitutional right to abortion (Norma
McCorvey, then known as plaintiff Jane Roe 38) now work as anti-abortion
activists, thus becoming would-be poster children for the legal salience of
abortion regret-despite the fact that these two carried to term the pregnancies
that brought them to the Supreme Court in the 1970s.39 Their recent efforts
32. See id. at 879-80 (noting how the Court's reasoning extends beyond the particular abortion
procedure in question); Turner, supra note 29, at 41 (same). The broad reach of such reasoning is
confirmed by the rationale used in Planned Parenthood v. Casey to uphold a detailed "informed
consent" requirement: "In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her
decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not
fully informed." 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (joint opinion). Analytical overkill also describes how the
Court cited the purported absence of information about the procedure to justify banning it altogether.
33. E.g., Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, supra note 27; Terry A. Maroney, Emotional
Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 889-902 (2009).
34. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory ofTrauma: Bodies and Minds ofAbortion Discourse, 1 10
COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010).
35. Brief of Sandra Cano et al., supra note 4.
36. 410U.S.179(1973).
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. For how McCorvey became plaintiff Jane Roe, see NORMA MCCORVEY WITH ANDY MEISLER, I
AM ROE: MY LIFE, ROE V. WADE AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE (1994), and SARAH WEDDINGTON, A
QUESTION OF CHOICE 50-54 (1992). See also Alex Witchel, At Home with: Norma McCorvey: OfRoe,
Dreams, and Choices, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1994, at Cl. Subsequently, McCorvey announced that she
had joined the pro-life movement, saying that she had "always been pro-life [but] just didn't know it"
and that she had been exploited by abortion-rights groups. See "Jane Roe" Joins Anti-Abortion Group,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. I1, 1995, at A12. Years later, she filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking to
revisit Roe, but the case was deemed moot. McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1154 (2005). More recently, McCorvey appeared as a protester during the confirmation
hearings of then Supreme Court Justice-designate, Judge Sonia Sotomayor. Peter Baker & Neil A.
Lewis, Judge Focuses on Rule of Law at the Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at Al.
39. E.g., Witchel, supra note 38.
2011] 263
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
reflect a strategic push among opponents of legal abortion to change the focus
from fetuses to the women who carry them, thereby purporting to challenge
advocates for gender equality and reproductive rights on their own feminist
turf.4 The majority opinion in Gonzales seems to validate such tactics4 -all
the more so because a close reading of the passage discussing women's regret
reveals its highly attenuated connection to the holding: that Congress acted
within constitutional bounds in banning one particular abortion procedure.42
Cano's brief recounts her story, including her unwanted pregnancy, her
reluctant (perhaps unknowing) role as an abortion-rights litigant pressured by
her family, her ultimate surrender of the child from that pregnancy for
adoption, and her subsequent anguish for her participation in the legalization of
abortion.4 3 Her brief also includes testimonials from 178 women detailing life-
long emotional trauma that they attribute to their past abortions -part of a
collection of symptoms dubbed "[p]ost-abortion [s]yndrome." 4 5  These
testimonials do not single out any particular abortion procedure, such as the one
at the center of Gonzales, but purport to identify problems arising from all
abortions.
Addressing the issues before the Court, Cano's brief attempts to counter
the argument advanced by challengers of the federal "Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act" that the omission of a therapeutic exception covering mental or
psychological health makes the law unconstitutional.46 The brief thus seeks to
40. Consider, for example, the efforts of Feminists for Life adherents,
http://www.feministsforlife.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). See also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics
ofAbortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991,
1002-29 (2007) (tracing the development of modern gender-based arguments against abortion from the
"traditional family values movement" to the woman-protective rationale underlying the attempt to ban
abortion in South Dakota). Those on the political right have appropriated the rhetoric of their opponents
in other controversies as well, most notably in the battle over same-sex marriage in California, where
advocates for Proposition 8 (the referendum changing the state constitution to limit marriage access to
heterosexuals) appropriated the rights rhetoric used to support marriage equality and successfully
deployed it to argue that expanded access to marriage would infringe the rights of parents to direct their
children's upbringing. See Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State,
and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 367-68 (2009) (explaining how proponents of
Proposition 8 argued that the measure would infringe the civil rights of private families who oppose
same-sex marriage).
41. For other examinations of this strategy and its use in Gonzales, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and
the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008)
(exploring appeals to dignity in Gonzales and other abortion cases); Rebecca E. Ivey, Note,
Destabilizing Discourses: Blocking and Exploiting a New Discourse at Work in Gonzales v. Carhart, 94
VA. L. REV. 1451, 1455 (2008) (exploring three discourses at work in Gonzales: "fetus-focused
discourses, physician-focused discourses, and woman-focused discourses").
42. 550 U.S. at 132; see also id. at 169 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43. Briefof Sandra Cano et al., supra note 4, at App. 1 -10.
44. Id. at App. 11-106.
45. See Turner, supra note 29, at 16-17; Bazelon, supra note 26.
46. In past cases, the Court had always required an exception to abortion restrictions when the
restriction posed a threat to the woman's health, as well as her life. E.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.




revisit the previously uninterrupted line of precedents elevating all aspects of a
woman's health over other considerations. It does so by contending that the
longstanding mental-health or psychological-health exception is not just
unnecessary but incoherent, because such exception would permit abortions
that themselves inflict mental or psychological harm.47
The Gonzales majority, however, employs the Brief not so much to accept
the asserted incoherence of requiring an inclusive health exception,48 but
instead to bolster the opinion's earlier paragraphs on the brutality and
gruesomeness of the abortion procedure it calls "intact D & E."4 9 When citing
Cano's brief, the majority portrays this brutality and gruesomeness as a trigger
for regret that the woman will experience after the abortion. Not surprisingly,
Justice Ginsburg and other observers wonder what this move might mean for
other abortion procedures, which might also be described as brutal and
50
gruesome.
By citing only Cano's brief while describing abortion regret as
"unexceptionable," the Court both overshoots and undershoots its mark. The
opinion implicates all abortions, not just those banned by the challenged
statute; yet it also fails to take into account what could be leamed from the full
range of judicial treatments of regret in other reproductive settings.
B. The Meaning of "Regret"
What does the Court mean by "regret"? The Gonzales opinion provides
few clues. Other authorities, however, offer definitions that might illuminate
some of the majority's assumptions and implications. Writing as an expert in
contract law, E. Allan Farnsworth defines regret as "the sensation of distress
that you feel on concluding that you have done something contrary to your
present self-interest, something that does not accord with your present
preferences." 51 According to law-and-emotion scholar Terry Maroney, "[t]o
say that a person 'regrets' something is to express that she has made a negative
self-evaluation based on past voluntary action now judged to be an avoidable
[T]he [physician's] medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the
attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is
room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,192 (1973).
47. Brief of Sandra Cano et al., supra note 4, at 6-26.
48. The Court upheld the statutory provision, articulating more circumscribed health justifications
than those required by past opinions. 550 U.S. at 161-67.
49. See 550 U.S. at 136.40 (discussing the intact D & E procedure); id. at 159 (citing Cano's Brief).
50. Id. at 182 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Guthrie, supra note 5, at 879; Manian, supra note
27, at 260-61.
51. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 20
(1998).
2011] 265
266 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 23:2
mistake, and that she has coupled that evaluation with a wish for an imagined
reality that would have obtained had the action been different." 52 Behavioral
law and economics scholar Chris Guthrie puts it this way: "[R]egret is a painful
feeling we experience upon determining that we could have obtained a better
outcome if we had decided or behaved differently."53 Jeannie Suk's challenge
to the feminist party line on abortion pushes the understanding of regret as
distress or pain a step further, connecting regret to trauma experienced (and re-
experienced, as in post-traumatic stress disorder) over past events.54
Psychological and psychoanalytic literature offers similar definitions,
while emphasizing the positive emotional growth that regret and regret-like
experiences can foster. So, for example, such literature connects regret to the
mourning process, which enables reality testing; it explains how regret
"allows reparative strivings to lead to potential interpersonal understanding"57
and "carries some clear benefits for the individual;"58 and it asserts that "the
sorrow of regret represents a developmental improvement over blaming others
for one's unhappiness."59 From this vantage point, regret signals a positive
transition: the embrace of one's past choice and an affirmation of "the chosen
path as one's own."60
52. Maroney, supra note 33, at 892-93.
53. Guthrie, supra note 5, at 882. Guthrie proceeds to criticize the Gonzales majority for failure to
take into account considerations revealed by psychological research, including regret aversion (the
anticipation of regret and its influence on decisionmaking), regret overestimation (the exaggeration of
the intensity and duration of anticipated regret), regret dampening (steps taken to minimize regret), and
regret learning (the benefits of regret for future decisionmaking).
54. Suk, supra note 34, at 1249-52.
55. See, e.g., JANET LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 36 (1993) ("Regret is
a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses,
transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes. It is an experience of felt-reason or reasoned-emotions.");
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking Forward to Looking Backward: The Misprediction of Regret, 15
PSYCHOL. Sci. 346 (2004) ("Regret is a counterfactual emotion that occurs when one recognizes that a
negative outcome was caused by one's own actions, and, indeed, self-blame is the critical element that
distinguishes regret from closely related emotions such as disappointment. Because self-blame is a key
ingredient in the recipe for regret, it is only natural that people should expect regret to be exacerbated by
factors that highlight their personal responsibility for negative outcomes.") (internal citations omitted);
Marcel Zeelenberg, The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk: A Note on the Rationality and Functionality of
Regret, 12 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 325, 326 (1999) ("Regret is the negative, cognitively based emotion that we
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted
differently.").
56. MELANIE KLEIN, Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States, in LOVE, GUILT AND
REPARATION & OTHER WORKS 1921-1945, at 344 (1975).
57. Susan Kavaler-Adler, The Conflict and Process Theory of Melanie Klein, 53 AM. J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 187, 200 (1993).
58. Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Experience of Regret and Disappointment, 12 COGNITION &
EMOTION 221, 228 (1998).
59. LANDMAN, supra note 55, at 219 (attributing this "pertinent insight" to Melanie Klein).
60. PETER SHABAD, DESPAIR AND THE RETURN OF HOPE: ECHOES OF MOURNING IN
PSYCHOTHERAPY 270 (2001).
Reproduction and Regret
Finally, as noted in the philosophical literature, regret might well follow
from a difficult decision regardless of the choice that one makes6 or even from
action causing an unintended result.62 In other words, regret can be understood
as an inescapable feature of engagement with the world.63
Gonzales's portrayal of regret does not track any of these understandings.
First, all these understandings of regret entail a look back in time, that is, a
second look at an earlier situation with knowledge that would not have been
available then. Gonzales's language, by contrast, explicitly portrays the
problem not simply as the subsequent rise of second thoughts but rather the
absence of full knowledge that would have been available at the outset: "It is
self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only
after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
assuming the human form."6 This absence of knowledge has far more
expansive implications, however, given the testimonials in Cano's brief, which
are not confined to just the particular banned abortion procedure. 65The
reasoning is eerily reminiscent of the campaign in the late nineteenth century to
criminalize abortion by persuading the public that women who sought such
services were "inadvertent murderesses" who did not appreciate what abortion
entailed.66 Further, Gonzales co-opts the premise of voluntary action underlying
the usual understandings of regret, a premise implicit in much of the legal
literature and explicit in the psychoanalytic conception of regret as evidence of
one's "owning" a past choice.
To address the possibility of post-decision grief and sorrow, the Gonzales
majority validates prohibiting access to intact D & E-a procedure that no
woman was ever compelled to undergo but rather that offered one option to
patients and their physicians. In so holding, the Court ignores the distress
experienced by those denied the banned procedure, which might result in the
birth of child facing a painful existence, damage to the woman's reproductive
61. Explaining incommensurability, Joseph Raz writes: "One has to show why the fact that an
agent is faced with options none of which is better or worse than the others does not justify his choice of
one of them, whatever it may be." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 362 (1986).
62. Bernard Williams writes of unavoidable "agent-regret" that follows even unintended results of
an actor's conduct, such as a truck driver's accidental running over a small child. BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, 1973-1980, at 27-30 (1981). See Sharon R. Krause, Political
Agency and the Actual, in READING BERNARD WILLIAMS 262, 270-71 (Daniel Callcut ed., 2009)
(discussing this aspect of Williams's work).
63. See Joseph Raz, Agency and Luck 7-13 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 09-214, 2009) (examining Bernard Williams's concept of agent-regret),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1487552.
64. 550 U.S. at 159-60 (emphasis added).
65. See Brief of Sandra Cano et al., supra note 4, at App. I1-106.
66. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 22 (1984); see Siegel, supra
note 28, at 1655-56.
67. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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future, or intense psychological hurt caused by the loss of control over difficult
personal and medical choices.68 And failing to look back even further, as Justice
Ginsburg points out, the majority opinion assumes that conception and the
sexual intercourse producing this result were either actively chosen or
inevitable, without considering a possible role for regret for such pre-abortion-
69decision occurrences.
C. Capturing Autonomy and Gender Equality: Regret as Reproach
The majority's language about the pre-abortion absence of knowledge and
post-abortion grief of "a mother" has more particularized significance. It
reflects a reliance on gender stereotypes that characterize women as ignorant,
naive, and unable to elicit pertinent information from health care providers, as
well as emotionally fragile if not psychologically unfit. 70 It also envisions all
pregnant women as "mothers" and ascribes to them self-sacrifice 71 and child
68. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in
Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1369, 1394-95 (2008). Some empirical evidence shows that women facing abortion decisions
experienced regret most often not from making "selfish choices," but instead from "capitulation to the
wishes of others." Maggie Jones Patterson et al., Abortion in America: A Consumer-Behavior
Perspective, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 677, 684 (1995). Others point to empirical evidence of mental health
problems experienced by women who sought abortions but were denied the procedure. Ronli Sifris,
Restrictive Regulation of Abortion and the Right to Health, 18 MED. L. REV. 185, 200-01 (2010); see
also Kathryn Abrams, Exploring the Affective Constitution, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 571, 592 (2009)
("[M]any empirical studies of post-abortion response ... suggest that the predominant emotion women
feel, both immediately after abortions and over the longer-term, is relief, and that few of those who do
feel grief or conflict over their choice actually regret it."); Jennifer Steinhauer, Long Floor Fight Over
Spending Cuts Gets Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at Al5 (reporting that Representative Jackie
Speier, D-CA, during a House floor debate over an amendment to take away federal funding of Planned
Parenthood, revealed that she had had an abortion).
More generally, one can find several studies suggesting that parenthood has a negative relationship
to adult happiness. E.g., DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 221-22 (2006); Robin W. Simon,
The Joys of Parenthood, Reconsidered, CONTEXTS, Spring 2008, at 40, available at
http://www.wfu.edu/-simonr/pdfs/Simon%20Contexts%202008.pdf
69. 550 U.S. at 184 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. As Jeannie Suk points out in tracing the understanding of psychological trauma, beliefs about
women's mental and emotional instability have a long history, including Freud's work on hysteria. Suk,
supra note 34, at 1201-03. But even earlier understandings of hysteria regarded the disease as a physical
problem based in the uterus, with the favored treatment the inducement of "hysterical paroxysms" by
means of a physician's or midwife's manual or mechanical stimulation of the patient's clitoris. See
Susan Ekberg Stiritz & Susan Frelich Appleton, Sex Therapy in the Age of Viagra: "Money Can't Buy
Me Love," 35 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 363, 402-03 (2011). See generally RACHEL P. MAINES, THE
TECHNOLOGY OF ORGASM: "HYSTERIA," THE VIBRATOR, AND WOMEN'S SEXUAL SATISFACTION 111-14
(1999) (tracing the history of the vibrator, including its use as medical treatment for "hysterical"
women). Whether viewed as emotional or physical, however, hysteria exemplifies the enduring
tendency to pathologize women's experiences.
71. Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic analysis of abortion as a woman's refusal to perform as a Good
Samaritan to the fetus challenges assumptions of maternal self-sacrifice. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A
Defense ofAbortion, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 62 (1971). The argument receives a full legal elaboration
in Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979). See also, e.g., EILEEN L.
MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996)
(conceptualizing abortion as akin to self-defense, with the fetus as an active agent to whose intrusion the
woman must consent); Suzanna Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (1989) (describing
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protection as preeminent interests, so that they necessarily feel self-reproach for
deviating from these norms.72 Because the majority essentializes women and
treats post-abortion self-reproach as a more reliable feeling than the prior
preference, it sees no need to argue that legislative decisions are generally better
than individual decisions for purposes of avoiding regret.73 In turn, the asserted
concern about women's self-reproach74 serves as a projection of judicial
reproach for those who would entertain undergoing the procedure in question,
or-given the testimonials in Cano's brief-any abortion.
We might call the archetype exemplified in Gonzales "regret as reproach"
or "the reproach model of regret." Such shorthand emphasizes judicial
disapproval, if not disdain, and also incorporates a cluster of reasons why
Gonzales's generalization about abortion regret has attracted so much criticism.
Justice Ginsburg and many of the commentators find especially offensive
the idea that the state could target abortion choices and limit them in order to
protect the women who make them. After all, up until Gonzales, abortion
jurisprudence had come to rest on an increasingly thick understanding of
autonomy,75  reinforced, albeit belatedly, with appreciation for what
reproductive self-determination (or its absence) means for gender equality.77
the Good Samaritan argument as the "best argument" for abortion freedom because it gets to the "real
question," which is "not the importance of the dependent life involved" but rather whether the pregnant
woman "may be compelled to provide the aid" without which the fetus will die).
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An
Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183-97 (2001) (criticizing feminists'
preoccupation with motherhood and "the repronormativity of motherhood").
73. In other words, the Court's assertions about the essential nature of women simplify the line of
reasoning. The Court no longer needs to establish that legislators are better able to predict individuals'
future feelings than the individuals themselves.
74. In examining a situation in which one regrets his or her own action, philosopher Joseph Raz
notes the connection between what Bernard Williams calls agent-regret and self-reproach:
The essentially self-referential character of regret is particularly poignant due to its
being, in part, about the person one is or was, as manifested on that occasion. It is
poignant in being not regret that there is such a person, but that I am such a person.
More specifically this instance of self-regret, though not all, involves something of a
self-reproach, and self-reproach is essentially self-referential.
Raz, supra note 63, at 9 (emphasis in original).
75. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life.").
76. Scholars highlighted the issue before the Court acknowledged it. E.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985);
Law, supra note 20.
77. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 856; id. at 927-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY 207-27 (2005) (recounting how Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), initially resisted the Court's gender equality rulings but came to
understand the link to abortion rights around the time of Casey); Heather J. Carlson, Blackmun s
Position Influenced Daughter's Decision About Pregnancy, POST-BULLETIN (Rochester, Minnesota),
Sept. 23, 2009 (reporting the unexpected teen pregnancy of Blackmun's daughter, her decision to marry,
the dissolution of that marriage, and her present activities as an advocate for abortion rights).
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78Gonzales's reliance on a woman-protective rationale -with its distrust of
individual understanding and decisionmaking, its reliance on maternal
stereotypes, 79 and its disapproval for those who would seek abortions-
embodies a thinly disguised frontal attack on autonomy and gender equality,
both underpinnings of reproductive rights. Critiques of Gonzales that take aim
at paternalism reflect astonishment at this "disconnect" as well as fear about
what it portends for the future of abortion rights and equality jurisprudence
more generally. From a more theoretical perspective, just as imaginative
thinking about alternative courses of action makes choice possible, 8 regret-no
matter how painful-can occur only if the subject had a choice to make.82
Using the profoundly gendered context of abortion to justify limits on
autonomy in order to prevent regret necessarily sets off alarms.
Despite these flaws, several reasons might suggest that Gonzales calls for a
more searching response. First, contrary to the critics, some authorities contend
that ascribing legal significance to regret-that is, allowing one to reconsider a
decision later-enhances autonomy, by removing at Time 2 a constraint
imposed at Time 1.83 This argument gains force because of studies
documenting widespread inability to predict even one's own emotional
responses to future events-the difficulty of affective forecasting,84 especially
when it comes to the intensity of one's feelings. One way to conceptualize this
difficulty sees it as absence of knowledge at Time 1, more precisely,
85knowledge then of how one will feel about the decision later, at Time 2.
86Although this absence of knowledge differs from that invoked by Gonzales,
78. See Siegel, supra note 40.
79. Id. at 1036-40; Rebecca J. Cook et al., Unethical Female Stereotyping in Reproductive Health,
109 INT'L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 255 (2010).
80. For a deeper analysis of the problems in trying to anchor reproductive justice to a constitutional
right to abortion, see Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing
Abortion Rights, 1]8 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009).
81. ETHEL S. PERSON, BY FORCE OF FANTASY 32 (1996) ("Imagination allows us to contemplate
alternatives to the real world. . . . Without it, there could be no picturing of mental alternatives to current
discomfort or deprivation, no planning of a future course of action, no creative rethinking of the past to
make it pertinent to the present and future."); Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 175, 178 (2010) ("Because conceiving of alternatives to the present state of affairs is a
necessary component of decision making, imagination is what, in part, makes individual choice
possible.").
82. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (noting psychological and psychoanalytic
understandings of regret); cf Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality and
Its Alternatives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 348, 348-49
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds, 2002) [hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES] (examining "power of
backward thinking" to compare what happened "to counterfactual alternatives that are constructed ad
hoc rather than retrieved from past experience").
83. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80
IND. L.J. 155, 234-37 (2005).
84. Id.at 165-81.
85. Even so, however, data show that people tend to overestimate negative emotions when
anticipating how they will feel in the future about particular events. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., supra
note 55.
86. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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the opinion blurs the distinction by conflating the absence of knowledge at
Time 1 of then-knowable facts with absence of knowledge at Time 1 of
emotional reactions that will not arise until Time 2.
Second, the literature on contract law claims to find a general trend
favoring "paternalism," that is, the ability of promisors to renege. Although the
freedom to renege seems to cut against the grain of a growing tendency to treat
promises as binding in the first place, some observers see the two developments
as related. They theorize that the opportunity to change one's mind operates as
a safety valve in an era of commitments increasingly recognized as binding.87
Gonzales's consideration of regret, albeit in a very different context, could be
rationalized as consistent with this trend, especially given the heightened
significance ascribed to personal choices such as abortion.88
Third, when Justice Ginsburg, who clearly supports women's reproductive
autonomy, expresses concern in Gonzales about pregnancies resulting from
sexual assault, she puts the question of consent (to sex) on the table. Feminist
theorist Catharine MacKinnon long ago portrayed abortion rights as one
additional tool in men's arsenal of control over women's sexuality.89 Others,
acknowledging our patriarchal world in which women remain subordinate to
men, stop short of MacKinnon's conclusion but call for more thoughtful
understandings of women's "consent," particularly in sexual intercourse. 90
More recently, Jeannie Suk pushes further still, arguing that such feminist
concerns about consent to sex problematize a constitutional right to make other
personal choices, including abortion.9' With these observations, the case for
legal consideration of second thoughts seems less strained and manufactured.
Finally, to the extent critics target Gonzales's portrayal of women as
unusually emotional, the psychoanalytic and psychological literature
complicates the argument. Despite the negative valence of regret, such painful
feelings are said to contribute positively to personal development.92 Thus,
ascribing emotions to women is not the problem, but rather might well evoke
additional concerns about autonomy and paternalism: singling out abortion
patients for protection against regret infantilizes women well beyond the
immediate choice to be made, denying them experiences that could prove
87. FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, at 20.
88. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 94 and accompanying text.
89. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983), in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93 (Catharine A. MacKinnon ed., 1987).
90. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a "Culturally Cliterate" Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 267, 335 (2008); Robin West, Sex, Law and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 221 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2010) [hereinafter West, Sex,
Law and Consent]; Robin West, The Harms of Consensual Sex, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS 317 (Alan Soble & Nicholas Power eds., 5th ed. 2008); see also MARCIA
DOUGLASS & LISA DOUGLASS, THE SEX YOU WANT: A LOVERS' GUIDE TO WOMEN'S SEXUAL
PLEASURE 148 (2002) (using the term "sex against desire" or "SAD").
91. Suk, supra note 34.
92. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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valuable for their ongoing growth, capacity, and agency. 9 3 Indeed, as noted,
various precedents indicate that reproductive matters occupy an elevated place
in each individual's self-definition or "concept of existence." 94 Given these
stakes, it becomes easy to speculate that regret about such matters must trigger
particularly sharp distress and poignant imaginings of a different self in a
different family or nonfamily that might have been 95-while also providing a
unique opportunity for developing emotional maturity.
Taken together, such considerations suggest that Gonzales's invocation of
abortion regret and its expression of disapproval masquerading as concern
about self-reproach call for more than reliance on autonomy, appreciation for
the importance of abortion freedom, rejection of gender stereotypes, and
condemnation of paternalism. The analysis that follows examines other factual
settings in which courts have confronted the legal significance of regret about a
reproductive decision or outcome. The range of contrasting treatments that
emerge contextualizes Gonzales's regret doctrine, allowing a deeper
exploration of the regulatory and other functions for which courts have used the
concept.
II. REPRODUCTION AND REGRET BEYOND GONZALES
Cases about abortion rights and other reproductive and related family
choices and activities articulate several shared foundational values. For
example, constitutional protection for "the decision to bear or beget a child," an
autonomy principle frequently cited in abortion cases, originated in Eisenstadt
v. Baird,96 a case about contraception. This principle later developed a life of its
own, appearing in a range of disputes about reproductive and other intimate or
family matters, from pregnancy-based discrimination to gay sex,98 access to
sex toys,99 family caps in public assistance programs, 00 sterilizationi'0 and
93. See id.
94. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
95. See PERSON, supra note 81, at 132; see also supra note 74 (quoting Raz on Williams: "The
essentially self-referential character of regret is particularly poignant due to its being, in part, about the
person one is or was, as manifested on that occasion."); cf Dale T. Miller & Brian R. Taylor,
Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and Superstition: How To Avoid Kicking Yourself, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 82, at 367.
96. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (striking down a law barring access to contraceptives by unmarried
individuals); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (reading Eisenstadt's "bear or beget"
language to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate a pregnancy).
97. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974); Ponton v. Newport News Sch.
Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1062 (E.D. Va. 1986); Lewis v. Del. State Coll., 455 F. Supp. 239, 248-49 (D.
Del. 1978).
98. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003); cf Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 621 n.64
(Md. 2007) (upholding a state statute prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
For an early reading of Eisenstadt challenging its suggestion of a right to sexual freedom, see Thomas C.
Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1980).
99. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev'd, Williams v. Attorney
General, 378 F.3d 1232 (1Ith Cir. 2004), aff'd, Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (1 Ith Cir. 2007).
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other restrictions on procreation;02 paternity; 103 parental custody;1" and the
exercise of other parental prerogatives;105 as well as surrogacy arrangements,' 06
the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs),i0 7 and adoptions.ios
The opinions in some such controversies, despite the shared values and
doctrinal similarities, present understandings of reproduction and regret that
differ significantly from the reproach model apparent in Gonzales. Selected
from this array, the following case studies identify five archetypes that both
supplement and unsettle Gonzales's approach. These case studies are just
that-studies or stylized sketches designed to capture a particular way of
thinking that some, though not necessarily all, courts embrace. Moreover, in
labeling the models exemplified by the case studies, I use names intended to
distill the stance, value, or purpose that I ascribe to the court in question-
shorthand for the particular deployment of regret that I see at work in each.
Thus, I attribute "reproach" to the Gonzales Court although the opinion never
uses that term. Accordingly, the ensuing case studies evoke models of regret
100. See C.K. v. N. J. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the argument that family caps unconstitutionally burden reproductive choice); cf Doe v.
Norton 356 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated by Maher v. Doe, 432 U.S.526 (1977).
101. Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 365-66 (D. Conn. 1978); Relfv. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp.
1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707
P.2d 760, 785 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821-22 (Colo. 1990);
Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1261-62 (Md. 1982); In re Eberhardy, 307
N.W.2d 881, 891-92 (Wis. 1981); cf In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719-20 (Mass. 1982); In re Grady, 426
A.2d 467, 473 (N.J. 1981); In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (N.C. 1976).
102. E.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 216 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing
Eisenstadt to assert the unconstitutionality of conditioning probation for a delinquent child support
obligor on the requirement that he has no more children); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding unconstitutional a no-pregnancy condition of probation after the defendant's
conviction of child neglect).
103. Inez M. v. Nathan G., 451 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982) (rejecting a putative
father's constitutional defense against a paternity adjudication); Sorrel v. Henson, No. 02A01 -9609-JV-
00212, 1998 WL 886561 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a
paternity statute); Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (acknowledging
Eisenstadt's language but rejecting an asserted constitutional right to avoid child support obligations).
104. Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 502 (Miss. 1998) (Smith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Eisenstadt in questioning the majority's reversal of the dismissal of an
unmarried father's suit for the intentional infliction of emotional distress against the mother who placed
a child for adoption in another state, thwarting his efforts to obtain custody).
105. E.g., Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia Cnty., 880 F.2d 305, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that reproductive choice includes the freedom to carry a pregnancy to term and allowing
parents to sue the school board for coercing minors to refrain from consulting their parents in connection
with abortion).
106. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002) (citing Eisenstadt in a gestational
surrogacy case to overturn statutory recognition that the woman who gives birth is the child's mother).
107. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. 111. 1990) (citing Eisenstadt in overturning
restrictions on the practice of reproductive endocrinology); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715-16 (N.J.
2001) (citing Eisenstadt in a dispute over the disposition of frozen preembryos); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992) (same); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)
(same), rev'd en banc, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); Smedes v. Wayne State Univ., No. 80 72583, 1980
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17850 at *10 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 1980) (citing Eisenstadt in a challenge to a clinic's
policy of denying to unmarried women access to donor insemination procedures).
108. Doe I v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 835 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (qpjecting birth mothers' argument that
allowing adoptees access to their birth records violates the constitutional right recognized in Eisenstadt).
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that I name "redemption" (in adoption surrenders), "resistance" (in surrogacy
arrangements), "responsibility" (in accidental parentage), "reconsideration" (in
the disposition of frozen embryos), and "respect" (in sperm donor agreements).
Each label emphasizes a distinctive doctrinal or rhetorical function of regret
about a reproductive decision or outcome, while also presenting an alternative
approach that Gonzales failed to acknowledge and investigating its fallout.
Despite the notable differences among the case studies, Gonzales emerges
as less of an anomaly than an iceberg's tip about how law constructs gender,
sex, choice, and reproduction. Together, these case studies challenge
Gonzales's depiction of the "causation" of regret, exposing both the state's role
in inducing regret and regret's regulatory function in exacting an appropriate
"price of pleasure" for certain sexual activities. Perhaps paradoxically, gender
stereotypes provide a recurrent theme at the same time that the case studies
ignore gender-for example, treating sexual intercourse, unlike technologically
assisted reproduction, as always an equally tempting, desired, enjoyable, and
satisfying erotic experience for men and women alike. This same analysis also
reveals how family law today has diverted attention from inconsistencies in its
policies and leading doctrines, in turn camouflaging its ongoing project of
sexual governance.
A. Surrenders of Infants for Adoption: Regret as Redemption
One especially conspicuous counterpoint to Gonzales can be found in the
legal treatment of regret experienced by women who have surrendered children
for adoption. I call this approach "regret as redemption" or "the redemption
model of regret," given judicial signals that regret has a positive role to play on
a sexually transgressive woman's path to redemption. Here, we see a
conceptualization of regret resembling that presented in the psychoanalytic
literature-the idea that such painful feelings about a past choice can spark
positive emotional development-but the resemblance is a mere caricature
because the autonomous choice that forms the foundation of the psychoanalytic
understanding is nowhere to be found in this case study. Although the most
vivid evidence comes from the period spanning the end of World War II to the
Supreme Court's required legalization of abortion in Roe v. Wade in 1973,109
contemporary cases and practices indicate the extent to which the earlier views
persist.
To capture how this model of regret played out during the earlier era and
how it operates in more recent times, two snapshots comprise this case study-
reflecting "then" and "now," respectively. An analysis of the governing legal
principles, including the treatment of regret, follows.
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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1. Evidence of the Practice ofSurrender
a. Then
During the pre-Roe decades, white unmarried mothers faced enormous
pressure to relinquish-or "surrender," 10 as the law often called it-their
infants for adoption. Adoption practice treated these women as neurotic and
deviant and hence unfit to parent, yet able to provide valuable resources
(babies) to married infertile couples."' Ann Fessler's disquieting book, The
Girls Who Went Away: The Hidden History of Women Who Surrendered
Children for Adoption in the Decades Before Roe v. Wade,"l 2 documents the
resulting misery through the narratives of many of these women; their painful
stories tell of parental pressures, stigma, shame, and life-long emotional
scars-all despite experts' paternalistic contentions that surrender would help
these women reconstitute their lives in a healthy way. 113 Reports like these
have prompted historian Rickie Solinger to generalize that "adoption is rarely
about mothers' choices; it is, instead, about the abject choicelessness of some
resourceless women." l4
The narratives in Fessler's book bear an uncanny similarity to the personal
story that Sandra Cano tells in her amici brief in Gonzales-the brief that
110. See, e.g., In re Janet G. v. New York Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (Fam. Ct.
1978). Both terms are evocative, especially "surrender," suggesting associations with religious beliefs
(the salvation to be achieved by "surrender to Christ") or rehabilitation from past transgressions
(Alcoholics Anonymous's 12-step "surrender"). Thus, for example, the New Testament of the Bible
commands, "Do not offer any part of yourself to sin as an instrument of wickedness, but rather offer
yourselves to God as those who have been brought from death to life; and offer every part of yourself to
him as an instrument of righteousness." Romans 6:13. Similarly, the third step in AA's 12-step program
recites that "[we] [m]ade a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we
understood Him." Alcoholics Anonymous, THE TWELVE STEPS ILLUSTRATED, available at
http://www.aa.org/pdf/products/p-55_twelvestepsillustrated.pdf.
111. RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES
ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 69-70 (2001) [hereinafter BEGGARS AND
CHOOSERS]. The conventional wisdom pathologized the behavior of white, unmarried mothers,
sometimes in expressly Freudian terms. See, e.g., LEONTINE YOUNG, OUT OF WEDLOCK: A STUDY OF
THE PROBLEMS OF THE UNMARRIED MOTHER AND HER CHILD 21-39 (1954). Contemporaneously, white
babies were sought-after commodities who would help white childless couples in this post-World War II
era of "compulsory parenthood." ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLESS
AMERICANS AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 141-43 (1995). Children of color born to unmarried
mothers during this era were often reared by their families, instead of being "placed out." ANDERS
WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROw: How SOUTHERN MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATIONTO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 78 (2009). The "deviancy" of such mothers was assumed inherent,
and their infants could not satisfy the desires of infertile adults seeking white babies. RICKIE SOLINGER,
WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 188 (1992).
112. ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO
SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006).
113. The narratives include reports of parental pressure that are remarkably similar to what Cano
describes in her own affidavit in her brief, supra note 4, at App. I -10.
114. SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS, supra note 111, at 67; see also Carol Sanger,
Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 489 (1996) (describing the marginalization of birth
mothers and their interests in twentieth-century adoption practice).
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constituted the sole citation of authority for the Gonzales majority's reliance on
abortion regret."15  The resemblance should come as no surprise, given that
Cano's unplanned pregnancy occurred during the same time period as those of
the women who contributed their reflections to Fessler's collection. This was a
era when respectable (white) women were expected to avoid sex before
marriage, and birth control and abortion remained out of reach in order to deter
or even punish transgressions."l 6 Moreover, despite Cano's role now in two
famous abortion cases," 7 Cano did not terminate the pregnancy but-just like
the women in Fessler's book-gave birth and surrendered the child for
adoption. 1f8
The testimonials of the "180 women injured by abortion" included in
Cano's brief report emotional reactions to their past abortions that closely track
the testimonials of surrendering birth mothers in Fessler's book. Consider first
these two affidavits from Cano's brief:
AFFIDAVIT
The State of Georgia
Deborah R. Paine
How has abortion affected you? The abortions caused me to feel
worthless, ashamed, angry, profound sadness. I was driven to
perfectionism to try and make myself feel worthy of the air I breathed
and space I occupied. I turned to 11 years of alcohol and drug
addiction to cope with the regret. In my need to punish myself, I had a
tubal ligation (sterilization). So I am childless. After killing my
children, I did not deserve to be a mother.... 119
AFFIDAVIT
The State of Kansas
Melody A. Athey
How has abortion affected you? I repressed any memory of the
experience for 25 years. My whole lifestyle changed after my abortion,
115. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
116. The stories took place not only before the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade but also before
it granted constitutional protection the year before to access to birth control by unmarried women in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
117. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
118. Brief for Sandra Cano et al., supra note 4, at App. 4.
119. Id. at App. 19.
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I started drinking heavily and married an alcoholic. Shortly after, I
tried suicide once and considered it several times. I had repeated
periods of depression especially around the anniversary date of my
abortion. The guilt I felt was overwhelming.120
Now, consider this account of a birth mother's experience, from Fessler's book:
I got married. I thought, "I better get myself off the streets. This is not
going well." I was just living this lie, this lie, this lie. "Do you have
children?" "No." It's like being Judas every time. You're denouncing
who you are, who they are. You just feel terrible. I married this man
under false pretenses. Did he ever know I had children? Absolutely
not. I didn't tell him.
I had a wedding, the wedding that my sister wanted. Everything was a
lie. I didn't want a wedding, but he was Italian and Catholic, and you
had to have a wedding. Oh, God. Then he says, "We can have
children." I looked at him, like, "Are you insane?" The last thing I
ever wanted to be was pregnant. I said, "I'm too young to get
pregnant." That's what I told him. I was twenty, twenty-one at the
time. He was an airline pilot, I was a stewardess. I said, "Well, maybe
in five years, I don't know." But the whole idea was so repellent to
me. It was all mixed up with this grief and this guilt. No, I just
couldn't.
So I'm married and everything is so perfect. We go on a Hawaiian
honeymoon-everything is just so, so, nice. We lived on forty acres of
land, we built this beautiful house, we had so much money. Every
weekend we were going over to my parents' house and having steak
dinners and barbecues. I remember one of these Sundays as we pulled
into my parents' suburban neighborhood I just started hitting my head
against the seat of the car. I was just going a little crazy. It was all the
things I couldn't say. It was July. The birth month. So July was
always horrible, horrible, horrible. Even if my mind didn't remember,
my body remembered. This really lives in your body.
-Diane lVl2'
Jeannie Suk recognizes the symptoms described by the women quoted in
Cano's brief as those characteristic of post-traumatic stress disorder. 122
120. Id. at App. 35.
121. FESSLER, supra note 112, at 210.
122. Suk,supra note 34, at 1232-33.
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Certainly the women in Fessler's book are similarly afflicted.123 The
juxtaposition is especially notable because of the frequency with which
antichoice advocates have touted adoption as the preferred alternative for
women facing unwanted pregnancies.124 Some of Fessler's narrators express
the view that the sequelae of an abortion would have been far less distressing
than their post-surrender anguish.125
b. Now
In re Adoption of D.N. T.,126 decided by a divided Mississippi Supreme
Court in 2003, complements the material from the pre-Roe decades, revealing
the persistence of the earlier attitudes and practices that account for the
"choicelessness"l 27 experienced by some birth mothers, at least in some
jurisdictions. In this case, the majority declined to let seventeen-year-old
Camille reclaim her baby, Diane, despite facts that led the dissent to find
"coercion" and "underhandedness" by the prospective adopters, Carol and
Rick, who "used every manipulative tactic available" to procure surrender.128
The case tells the following story: Soon after Camille, then age sixteen,
gave birth to Diane in Texas, she and baby Diane moved to Arizona, where
Camille's mother, Sally, lived. There, Camille agreed to have Sally serve as
Diane's guardian. With Diane, Camille traveled from Arizona to visit her
father, Curt, in Mississippi; there Camille met Carol, and Carol's husband,
Rick, a couple desperately seeking an infant to adopt. Carol's mother was
living with Curt, and she facilitated the introduction.129
In response to Carol and Rick's invitation, Camille and Diane moved into
the couple's home, where Carol cared for Diane and supported both Camille
and Diane for several months. For most of this period, Camille was present at
the home during the day but, with encouragement from Carol and Rick, she
spent many nights elsewhere with a new boyfriend, Calvin. Carol and Rick
123. See FESSLER, supra note 112, at 211 (listing symptoms that include, inter alia, depression,
shame, self-loathing, "and occasionally post traumatic stress disorder, characterized by extreme anxiety,
panic attacks, flashbacks, and nightmares"); id. at 233 (quoting a birth mother's assertion that she had
"all the classic symptoms" of post-traumatic stress disorder). For judicial acknowledgment of the
emotional stakes in surrender, albeit in essentializing terms, see Roe v. New York Foundling Hosp., 318
N.Y.S.2d 508, 515 (App. Div. 1971) (Stevens, P.J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe bond between natural mother
and child is generally the strongest of all bonds").
124. For the rise of contemporary arguments for adoption as a preferred alternative to abortion, see
Siegel, supra note 28, at 1678 n.] 22.
125. FESSLER, supra note 112, at 53; see also OFF AND RUNNING (First Run Features 2009). In this
documentary, Avery, an adopted teen who tries to find and establish a relationship with her birth mother,
discovers she is pregnant and has an abortion. Tellingly, Avery states that she would never have a baby
and surrender the child for adoption.
126. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003).
127. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
128. 843 So. 2d at 717 (McRae, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 694.
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discussed adopting Diane with Camille, who neither consulted her mother,
Sally, nor obtained independent counsel. Instead, Camille initially acquiesced
in the adoption plan, and she signed a letter asking the Arizona court to
terminate Sally's guardianship there. Accordingly, about three months after
Camille and Diane arrived in Mississippi, the Arizona guardianship was
terminated, and Carol and Rick submitted in a Mississippi court a sworn
complaint for adoption, which Camille signed under oath, again without
consulting her mother or counsel. In fact, all the paperwork for Camille to
terminate the guardianship and to consent to adoption had been prepared by the
attorney for Carol and Rick.'30
Only two weeks later, Camille changed her mind. She regretted her
decision to surrender Diane for adoption by Carol and Rick. Camille filed an
objection, asking the court to nullify any documents she had signed. Camille's
mother, Sally, came to Mississippi, joining Camille in these proceedings.
Nonetheless, the court awarded temporary custody of Diane to Carol and Rick,
who required Camille to leave their home and denied Camille the opportunity
to see Diane. '3 In fact, when Camille had told Carol and Rick that she had
changed her mind, Carol cried, and Rick told Camille to get the '"f- out of his
house' and that 'no one was going to take this baby from them-that he would
hurt anyone that tried."'l
32
In D.N. T, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled against Camille and her
mother, Sally, after Camille attempted to revoke her consent to adoption of her
baby, Diane. Allowing the adoption case to proceed, the court relied inter alia
on language in the state adoption consent statute that makes the parent's age
irrelevant, construing Camille's initial surrender as an abandonment sufficient
to justify termination of parental rights and condemning Camille's bad
decisions and immaturity, including specifically her sexual relationship with
her new boyfriend, Calvin.'33
2. The Law ofSurrender, Regret, and Revocation
As a matter of law, surrender for adoption, just like abortion, requires
consent, although a child can become available for adoption through
involuntary termination of parental rights in cases of sufficiently extreme and
persistent abuse or neglect.134 Contests about consent to adoption or surrender
130. Id. at 694-95.
131. Id.at695.
132. Id. at 708.
133. Id. at 709.
134. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 & n.10, 768 (1982) (articulating a requirement of
parental unfitness that must be established by a more demanding standard than a preponderance of the
evidence for state termination of parental rights).
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implicate an important autonomy right, namely "the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children," which is "perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by . . . [the Supreme] Court."' 35
Despite the similar settings, however, the legal responses to assertions of regret
diverge sharply in the context of abortion, on one hand, and adoption, on the
other. Although Gonzales makes a generalization about women's post-abortion
regret legally relevant, women's post-surrender regret-even when expressed
on an individual, subjective basis-often carries no such legal weight.
Surrenders are hard to revoke, usually requiring the birth mother to prove
"fraud, misrepresentation, duress, overreaching, mistake or corruption."136
Although reformers have proposed various safeguards, no legal authority has
suggested, parallel to Gonzales's reasoning, that prospective regret ought to
preclude altogether particular options for birth parents,137 1namely surrender,
even if certain anti-adoption support groups might embrace this preference.138
In the pre-Roe days, when birth mothers who had second thoughts went to
court even shortly after they surrendered, judges seem to have regarded their
emotional difficulties as "unexceptionable,"l39 yet refused to honor a change of
mind, even under a then-modern standard allowing judicial discretion. For
example, in the words of one court declining to allow a birth mother to revoke
her consent:
Contemplation of the surrender of one's own child is in many, if not
all, cases a cause of emotional and mental stress. Many such
surrenders are undoubtedly by mothers of children born out of wedlock
and are contemplated because the trying circumstances tend to show
that the welfare of the child calls for action at variance with that
dictated by natural instincts of maternal love and affection. No statute
has said that surrenders are valid only if executed free from emotion,
tensions, and pressures caused by the situation. No principle of law
requires the rule. A balance of the interests of the persons concerned
and of society weighs strongly against it.140
135. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
136. Stotler v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Iowa, 209 N.W.2d 121, 127-28 (Iowa 1973); see also In re
Adoption of Baby C., 480 A.2d 101 (N.H. 1984) (determining by statute that withdrawal of the birth
mother's consent would not serve the child's best interests).
137. Some would argue that children have a "right" to learn the identities of their birth parents upon
adulthood. E.g., MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS
MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND
UNWED PARENTS 22 (2001).
138. See Lucinda Franks, Annals of Law: The War for Baby Clausen, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22,
1993, at 56, 58-61 (recounting anti-adoption views of Concerned United Birthparents). For additional
analysis of CUB's views and advocacy, see SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS, supra note 111, at
103-38.
139. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
140. In re Surrender of Minor Children, 181 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Mass. 1962). This language also
appears in In re Adoption of a Minor Child, 287 A.2d 115, 121 (R.I. 1972). Further, the conventional
wisdom regarded an unmarried birth mother's desire to keep the child as additional evidence of her
[Vol. 23:2280
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One can find resemblances between the legal responses then and now.
True, most unmarried women who carry their pregnancies to term today rear
their children. 141 Nonetheless, one still sees stories of deep and anguished
regret in reported cases of attempted revocations of adoption plans. Birth
mothers usually prevail only when they can prove coercion or duress,142 and
courts often set a high legal threshold for such findings. For example, one state
appeals court stated, "'[P]roof of inexperience, indecisiveness, uncertainty,
emotional stress and a failure to fully comprehend the effect of surrender is
insufficient to justify revocation." 43 Even when circumstances raise serious
questions about the voluntariness of the initial consent or surrender-as in
D.N.T., when the birth mother is a minor and especially eager prospective
adopters have exploited her vulnerabilities-simple regret, no matter how
intensely felt, typically fails to carry the day in court.'"
Some of the adoption cases and literature, including the reminiscences
collected in Fessler's book,145 suggest that regret has no legal traction because
the initial requirement of voluntary consent itself receives only lip service, as
illustrated by D.N.T. Surely, Camille's status as a minor and the surrounding
circumstances raise significant questions about the voluntariness and
genuineness of her consent, questions the dissenting judges would find fatal.146
Especially provocative is the majority's rejection of Camille's argument that,
by analogy, her inability under state law to have an abortion without parental
emotional instability. See, e.g., CALEB FOOTE, ROBERT J. LEVY & FRANK E.A. SANDER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 136-38 (1966) (instructing law students about relevant considerations in
counseling unmarried mothers). See generally YOUNG, supra note Ill (attempting to explain
personality patterns that produce out of wedlock births and decisionmaking about adoption and other
responses).
141. Paul Placek, National Adoption Data, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV 3, 11 (National Council for
Adoption, 2007) (reporting 98%).
142. E.g., D.N.T., 843 So. 2d at 707-09; Baby C., 480 A.2d at 104; see also JESSICA VALENTI, THE
PURITY MYTH: How AMERICA'S OBSESSION WITH VIRGINITY IS HURTING YOUNG WOMEN 114 (2009)
(reporting schemes to pay teens to carry pregnancies to term and surrender babies for adoption). But see,
e.g., McCann v. Doe, 660 S.E.2d 500, 505, 508 (S.C. 2008) (allowing particular "emotional stressors" to
justify revocation).
143. Sigurdson v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Serv. (In re Dependency of MS), 236 P.3d 214,
218 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re Adoption of Baby Girl K., 615 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980)). In Baby Girl K., the court concluded: "We hold that a lack of full understanding of the
consequences, coupled with inexperience, emotional stress, uncertainty and indecisiveness are
insufficient findings to allow repudiation of the surrender." 615 P.2d at 1315.
144. See, e.g., Kayla P. v. Morgan C., No. ICA-JV 09-0190, 2010 WL 987071 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2010); In re Minor Child David, 256 A.2d 583, 587-88 (Me. 1969); In re Baby Boy L., 534 N.Y.S.2d
706 (App. Div. 1988). Indeed, also worth noting is the frequency of state intervention in ethnic and
racial minority families, often including involuntary terminations of parental rights. In these cases,
parental choice and autonomy expressly give way to the state's asserted interest in protecting children
from harm, a test that critics see as racially biased. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS:
THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002); Mary Lyndon Shanley, Toward New Understandings of
Adoption: Individuals and Relationships in Transracial and Open Adoption, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND
STATE 15, 38 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion Young eds., 2003).
145. FESSLER, supra note 112.
146. 843 So. 2d at 717-20 (McRae, P.J., joined by Diaz, J., dissenting).
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consent (or court authorization obtained through a judicial bypass) should
invalidate her surrender of her child. In the abortion context, the U.S. Supreme
Court has cited the immaturity and vulnerability of minors as reasons why
states may impose additional hurdles that would not survive constitutional
scrutiny if applied to adults, 147 but it has not yet considered what this analysis
means for minors' consent to adoptions. Certainly, the D.N.T. majority's glib
reliance on the lower court's logic-that when Camille gave birth, she became
a parent and thus achieved emancipation-fails to grapple satisfactorily with
the autonomy values at stake.148
Instead of engaging seriously with the legal import of regret for
improvident consent, the opinions in such cases often express disapproval of
the birth mother's behavior. This negative stance is apparent in the D.N.T
court's treatment of Camille's initial surrender as abandonment,149 with no
inquiry whether such conduct might constitute a parental act, such as arranging
for alternate care for one's child.'50
Often, the expressions of disapproval focus on the birth mother's sexual
activities. For example, the D.N.T. majority explicitly condemned Camille,
stating: "The record is replete with bad decisions Camille has made her entire
life. She has proven herself immature beyond understanding, as evidenced
adequately by her own testimony of leaving Diane with almost strangers (Rick
and Carol) while she spent the nights at her new boyfriend's house having sex
and smoking marihuana with him."'' Older cases often followed a similar
approach,152 revealing a mindset that tracks the general attitudes of the pre-Roe
adoption boom: white unmarried birth mothers were neurotic and deviant, as
their sexual activities demonstrated, but placement of their babies in two-parent
homes could set these women on a respectable path and save the children,
too.
Against this background, the distress and pain of regret emerge as well-
deserved punishment for women who have transgressed prevailing sexual
147. See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, WHO DECIDES? THE ABORTION RIGHTS OF TEENS
(2006).
148. 843 So. 2d at 709-10; see also Emily Buss, The Parental Rights of Minors, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
785, 792-93 (2000).
149. 843 So. 2d at 707-08.
150. See, e.g., In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d I (Mo. 2004) (reversing termination of parental rights
based on the mother's twice surrendering twins for adoption); Sanger, supra note 114, at 422 ("[T]he
distinction between providing alternate care for one's child and disregarding the child altogether is often
overlooked").
151. 843 So. 2d at 709.
152. E.g., Roe v. New York Foundling Hosp., 318 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1971). Such courts
emphasize that the birth mother who changes her mind might have improper motives. See id. at 512; see
also FOOTE, LEVY & SANDER, supra note 140, at 137 (instructing law students that "there must be
consideration of the [unmarried] mother's motives for wanting to the keep the child").
153. FESSLER, supra note 112, at 182-85; SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS, supra note 111, at
69-70; see also MAY, supra note 111, 141-43 (noting how white babies became valuable commodities
after World War II in the era of"compulsory parenthood" in the U.S.).
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norms. Rather than trying to address or prevent this emotion, adoption practice
and case law often treat regret as a regulatory device, part of the price of illicit
sex and also the start of the road to redemption. Under the conventional
wisdom, surrender constitutes a prerequisite for a woman to overcome her
aberrant past and clear the way for a more socially acceptable future. This
paternalistic approach disregards a birth mother's assessment of her own best
interests.
Of course, regret that serves as punishment is itself socially constructed.
We can surmise that, absent powerful cultural forces, some surrendering
mothers might well have felt (or admit that they felt) liberated. 154 Regardless,
attitudes about women's nonmarital sexual activities meant that white birth
mothers perceived that they had no choice but to relinquish their babies, and
this absence of autonomy assumed its own distinctively oppressive character, 55
reinforced by law.
The Supreme Court's early abortion cases, Roe v. Wadel56 and Doe v.
Bolton,'5 7 took for granted such sex-negative attitudes, citing the resulting
emotional burden as a basis of the liberty interest driving recognition of a
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy. Today, the Supreme Court has
given its constitutional blessing to sexual relationships that take place outside
marriage, even celebrating them, at least for men.' 59  Nonetheless, earlier
norms persist, and the Court's recent solicitude does not explicitly consider,
beyond disallowing criminal penalties, how far law may go in imposing or
reinforcing consequences that might follow from nonmarital sex.160
Disapproval of women's sexual choices continues to loom large in abortion law
154. Carol Sanger notes the strong social norm of maternal presence, Sanger, supra note 114, at
424; the frequent internalization of this norm, id. at 445; and the portrayal as "monsters" of those
mothers who happily surrender their children, id. at 432.
155. Fessler herself has emphasized this point. Ann Fessler, Author of The Girls Who Went Away,
NARAL Pro-Choice Missouri Speakers Series, St. Louis, MO (Mar. 24, 2009).
156. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
157. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
158. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (listing detriments, including "additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood"); Doe, 410 U.S. at 196-97 (discussing physicians' empathy for patients'
"woes" and awareness of patients' "human frailty, so-called 'error,' and needs").
159. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to
Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1182 (2006)
(describing "clear judicial approval"); see also Ariela Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the
Genus ofIllicit Sex, 15 YALE L.J. 756, 763 (2006) ("If, historically, marriage was the sine qua non of
licit sex and nonmarriage necessarily marked sex as illicit, Lawrence turns that construct on its head by
linking the licit nature of same-sex sex to its location outside of legal marriage."). Of course, many
lower courts have read Lawrence narrowly so that it only protects against criminal punishment for
consensual sexual activity in private. See, e.g., Kim Shayo Buchanan, The Sex Discount, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1151-52 (2010). Further, one can read Lawrence as a celebration of same-sex relationships
only to the extent that they mimic marriage. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of
Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414-16 (2004).
I60. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59
EMORY L.J. 809, 812-35 (2010) (detailing prevailing sex negativity and its persistence even after
Lawrence). For additional analysis, see infra notes 227-285, 477-498 and accompanying text.
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and politics, as illustrated, for example, by proposed abortion bans with
exceptions for rape and incest 61-situations in which the woman arguably did
not consent to sexual intercourse or, at least, presumably did not enjoy it.162
These authorities hint at the operation of the traditional sexual double
standard,163 which comes into sharper focus with the juxtaposition of cases
analyzing defects in birth fathers' consent to adoption. One finds a number of
successful claims by unmarried fathers overturning adoptive placements, even
some that had lasted for years, because of violation of these men's liberty
interests. 16 True, law might well distinguish between a birth parent who
consents but later changes her mind and one who was excluded from the
process altogether; nonetheless, cases like D.N. T. raise doubts about what
meaningful participation in the process should require. Tellingly, in one of the
most highly publicized struggles in which a birth mother changed her mind, the
"Baby Jessica case," the birth mother prevailed only after joining the birth
father's claim that he had been improperly excluded from the process-even
though his exclusion occurred solely because she had purposely thwarted him
from satisfying the requirements for legal participation by first falsely
identifying a different man as the father.165 By herself, Baby Jessica's birth
mother would not have succeeded in revoking her consent.
As a result, one cannot explain the legal irrelevance of birth mothers'
regret by citing the well-founded reliance or investment of the prospective
adopters, or even the psychological bonds to the adopters forged by the child
between the initial placement and the court proceedings following attempted
revocation.166 First, not all adopters deserve such judicial solicitude, as Carol
161. E.g., No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act, H.R. 3, 112th Cong. § 308 (2011).
162. Of course, sometimes women even experience orgasm in rape or other coercive sex. See
SAPPHIRE, PUSH 24, 35 (Vintage Books 1997) (1996); FAMILY AFFAIR (C-Line Films 2010); see also,
e.g., Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) ("The trial court did not err in refusing to allow
Curtis' attorney to ask the prosecutrix [the victim] whether she experienced orgasm during these acts of
intercourse; the answer would have been legally irrelevant to the issue of consent."). Even if our
vocabulary lacks a word to describe such phenomena, clearly "enjoyment" or "pleasure" is too
simplistic to be a suitable candidate.
163. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 787-88 (1988). Kim Buchanan sees evidence of this double standard in the
operation of a "sex discount," which becomes apparent in the level of scrutiny that the Supreme Court
applies. Although gender-based discriminatory state action triggers intermediate scrutiny, the Court
uses such heightened review only when it sees such state action as a regulation of public life; the Court
employs less demanding rationality review instead when framing the state action as a regulation of sex.
Buchanan, supra note 159.
164. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) ("Baby Jessica" case, halting proposed adoption
and ending pre-adoptive placement); In re Petition of John Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.) (vacating
adoption); In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111.), stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner,
513 U.S. 1138 (1995) ("Baby Richard" case).
165. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239. The mother's deception of the birth father in the famous "Baby
Richard" case also gave her an opportunity to change her mind about her own decision to surrender.
Petition ofJohn Doe, 638 N.E.2d at 181-82.
166. Certainly, such issues were raised in the litigation. E.g., B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245; In re
Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668-69 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
[Vol. 23:2284
2011] Reproduction and Regret 285
and Rick in D.N. T. illustrate.167 Second, a hypothesis that focuses on the
adopters or even the child as the "promisee(s)"168 fails to take into account the
apparently greater readiness to undo placements in response to some birth
fathers' claims. Although this double standard does not perfectly map onto the
maternal stereotype animating Gonzales's regret rhetoric, both have a place in a
larger gender script.169 Just as, per Gonzales, pregnant women should be
willing to sacrifice their health for the sake of their fetuses, even those they
would abort, so too a birth mother like Camille should be willing to endure
psychological pain so that her child (as well as she herself) can enjoy a
supposedly better future. 170 By contrast, unmarried birth fathers do not need
redemption, they encounter far fewer expectations of altruism, and their
offspring-even those whom these men previously did not suspect existed-
constitute their protectable "rights," if not their "property." Indeed, men's
regret serves other purposes, as explored below.172
This analysis highlights how legal rules construct regret and do so in a
gendered manner. Reforming the law to give birth mothers more time to
change their minds or ensure them legal counsel, as some have proposed, could
help reshape the emotional landscape. 173 Likewise, imposing more rigorous
requirements of affirmative conduct on birth fathers who would object to
adoption, as some states have done,174 not only sends a normative message but
child's bonds with the adoptive family to challenge the majority's deference to lowa's jurisdiction in
this multistate controversy).
167. For another illustration, see Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787 (N.Y.
1971). After the Scarpetta court concluded that the child's "surrender was improvident and that the
child's best interests-moral and temporal-will be best served by its return to the natural mother," the
adoptive parents fled with "Baby Lenore" to Florida. Id. at 792. Scarpetta (the birth mother) filed a
habeas corpus action there, claiming full faith and credit for the New York decision. At the ensuing trial,
the court again focused on the child's best interests. The DeMartinos (the adoptive parents) successfully
argued that they should not be bound by litigation in which they were not permitted to participate, and
the Florida court ruled that the DeMartinos should retain custody. See Henry H. Foster, Jr., Adoption
and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). The U.S. Supreme Court
denied certiorari, DeMartino v. Scarpetta, 404 U.S. 805 (1971).
168. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, at 15, 37-38.
169. This gender script commonly includes, inter alia, greater stigma and punishment for sexually
active unmarried women than for their male counterparts. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
448 (1972) (rejecting the assumption that limits on access to birth control by unmarried persons were
designed to prescribe "pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication,
which is a misdemeanor"); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990)
(illustrating the practice of punishing sexually active female students, as shown by their pregnancies, but
not their male counterparts, who also conceived).
170. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting assumptions about women's self-sacrifice in
the abortion context).
171. Of course, one can find cases in which courts give short shrift to fathers' efforts to claim a
child whom the mother attempts to surrender for adoption. See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.B., 232 P.3d
1026 (Utah 20 10).
172. See infra notes 224-285 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., In re Janet G. v. New York Foundling Hosp., 403 N.Y.S.2d 646, 651 (Fam. Ct.
1978); Elizabeth Samuels, Time To Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers' Consents to the Adoption of
Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509 (2005).
174. See, e.g., T.B., 232 P.3d at 1038 (requiring strict compliance with Utah's statute).
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
also could increase the likelihood that men will experience adoption regret for
failure to act. In fact, before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Stanley v.
Illinoisl75 in 1972, most states excluded unmarried birth fathers from the
adoption process altogether, often by defining "parent" narrowly so as to omit
such men.'76  Under this regime, no doubt some felt wrongly excluded while
others embraced the "free pass" their exclusion provided. In either case,
however, the regret they might have felt or not felt cannot easily be
disentangled from the legal expectations prescribed, any more than we can
appreciate birth mothers' emotions outside of their legal and social context.177
B. "Surrogate-Mother"78 Arrangements: Regret as Resistance
If the legal salience of regret in Gonzales,179 on one hand, and that in
adoption cases like D.N.T.,so on the other, occupy points at the extreme
opposing ends of a continuum, then In re Baby M,' ' the case that made
"surrogacy" a household word, falls much closer to the Gonzales pole. The
case and the legal principle for which it stands make regret determinative, even
though the court treated the controversy as an adoption matter. Baby M,
holding surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable,182 epitomizes the judicial
exploitation of regret to resist changes in the legal status quo from
encroachments by unfamiliar processes of family formation. Hence, we might
see in this case study a paradigm of a court's use of "regret as resistance" or
"the resistance model of regret."
The story of the case has been frequently told.183 With the intermediation
of the Infertility Center of New York, Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to conceive
a child, by "artificial insemination" (now often called "alternative
insemination")184 with the semen of William Stem and then to relinquish the
175. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
176. E.g., id. at 649-50 (invalidating an Illinois statute that did not include unmarried fathers in the
definition of"parent").
177. See infra notes 374-404 and accompanying text.
178. 1 use the terminology popular at the time of the principal case in this section, In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), despite well-founded criticisms of the phrase "surrogate mother." For
example, Barbara Katz Rothman writes: "A surrogate is a substitute. In some human relations, we can
accept no substitutes. Any pregnant woman is the mother of the child she bears. Her gestational
relationship establishes her motherhood. BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD
167 (2000).
179. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
180. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003).
181. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
182. Id. at 1240.
183. In addition to inspiring extensive news coverage at the time and a still vibrant body of legal
scholarship (see, e.g., J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U. L. REV.
345 (2011)), the story of Baby Mwas featured in a made-for-TV movie starring JoBeth Williams. BABY
M (ABC Circle Films 1988).
184. Some authorities now prefer "alternative insemination" over the older term. See SHANLEY,
supra note 137, at 80.
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infant to Stern and his spouse, Elizabeth Stem, with the latter to undertake an
adoption proceeding.'8 5 Whitehead changed her mind, however. Within hours
after initially turning over the three-day-old infant to the Sterns, Whitehead
"became deeply disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with unbearable sadness. She
had to have her child. She could not eat, sleep, or concentrate on anything other
than her need for her baby." 86
This portrait of despair, elaborated in Whitehead's subsequent memoir,1
is of a piece with both the snapshots in Cano's Gonzales brief and the more
extended reflections in Fessler's book about surrendering birth mothers.' 88
Note the legal impact: First, by holding the agreement void and unenforceable,
the court validates Whitehead's intense, almost primal feelings, naturalizing her
maternal longing and regret, in turn rendering her initial promise to relinquish
the child an "unnatural" deviation, all in stark contrast to the adoption cases.
Second, unlike the adoption cases, Baby M not only decides that regret should
count; like Gonzales, it relies on the regret of "some women" (here, one
woman) to propound a general rule applicable to all.189 The Baby M court's
leap provides a haunting reminder of the notorious opinion in Bradwell v.
Illinois, upholding the denial of law licenses to women, in which Justice
Bradley conceded that not all women would conform to the marital and
maternal norm while still insisting that legal generalizations need not make
room for the exceptional case. 190 Such reliance on generalizations about gender
roles is precisely what the Supreme Court's contemporary antistereotyping
approach to sex discrimination disallows. 91
Accordingly, claiming to invoke principles from adoption law, the New
Jersey Supreme Court decided in Baby M that surrogacy agreements are void
because they conflict with:
(1) laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions;
(2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before
185. 537 A.2d at 1234-35; Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of
Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
186. 537 A.2d at 1236.
187. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD WITH LORETTA SCHWARTZ-NOBEL, A MOTHER'S STORY: THE
TRUTH ABOUT THE BABY M CASE 25-27 (1989).
188. As others have noted, Whitehead's attorney, Harold Cassidy, has now directed his legal efforts
to fighting legalized abortion. Sanger, supra note 185, at 97 n.155; Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy andthe
Politics ofCommodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 143 (2009); Suk, supra note 34, at 48.
189. Elizabeth Scott has pointed out how Baby Mprompted women-protective arguments like those
more recently raised in the abortion context and illustrated by Gonzales. Scott, supra note 188, at 142-
43.
190. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141-42 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
191. See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (emphasizing
the impermissibility of gender stereotyping); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010). On the costs of using gender-role
feminism as a strategy to secure abortion rights, see Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of
Motherhood and the Future ofAbortion Rights, TEX. J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 830232.
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termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and
(3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption
revocable in private placement adoptions.
After setting aside the contract, the court treated the resulting dispute as a
custody fight between two legal (here, biological) parents, in turn preserving
the traditional contours of "family." While custody went to Stern, Whitehead
got visitation. 193
Although Gonzales's reliance on regret fails to distinguish between the
absence at Time 1 of information that one could know then (the details of the
abortion method) and the absence at Time 1 of unknowable information about
the future (one's feelings at Time 2 about the past abortion), Baby M and the
literature it has generated use a more precise analysis. Even if the
intermediary, the Infertility Center of New York, could have more carefully
screened Whitehead before she entered the agreement at Time 1194 and even if
such surrogates have full understanding of all available information at Time 1,
Baby M has come to exemplify a requirement of contemporaneous consent,
based on one brief paragraph in a very long opinion:
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before
she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a
totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision
prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed,
and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual
commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000
payment, is less than totally voluntary ... .195
Thus, for example, based on empirical evidence of the inaccuracy of
affective forecasting, Jeremy Blumenthal supports the rule derived from Baby
M that surrogates must have the opportunity to change their minds after
birth. 196
Baby M, in its day, evoked some of the same critiques that followed
Gonzales. Although feminists divided in reaction to the case,' 97 some, most
192. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988).
193. Id. at 1237.
194. See Sanger, supra note 185, at 85-86.
195. 537 A.2d at 1248.
196. Blumenthal, supra note 83, at 212-13; see also Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices
and Uniform Decisions: Adopting the ABA's Self-Enforcing Administrative Model to Ensure Successful
Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 237, 249 (2010).
197. For commentary advocating restrictions or even bans on surrogacy to prevent exploitation, see
Gena Corea, Junk Liberty, in RECONSTRUCTING BABYLON: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND TECHNOLOGY 142,
153-156 (H. Patricia Hynes ed., 1991); Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery and the Ownership ofLife, 13
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 140 (1990). Some of these concerns about exploitation focus on the class
differences typified by Baby Mand played out in scenarios in which racial minorities serve as surrogates
or gestation is outsourced to poor women in other countries. E.g., Lorillard, supra note 196, at 250;
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prominently Marjorie Shultz, condemned Baby M's legally required
opportunity for a post-birth change of mind as unwelcome paternalism that
reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes.' 98 In fact, the court's unwillingness
to abandon the traditional "tender years" approach, with its elevation of
maternal bonds over those shared by young children and their fathers, in
tandem with the naturalization of Whitehead's emotions, belie the opinion's
recitation of a commitment to gender equality.1 99
Given Baby A's reliance on adoption law, one would expect to find
parallels in the legal relevance of regret in the two contexts, adoption
surrenders and surrogacy agreements. Although courts minimize regret when
surrendering birth mothers seek to change their minds, a focus on timing
provides one way to reconcile the disparity. Both contexts treat as invalid
prebirth consents to relinquish a child.200  The adoption cases dismissing
attempted revocations all concern consents given after the child's birth, while
Baby M takes aim at the problems of an agreement entered even before
conception. Yet, these particular timing differences stand out as important
because the law makes them so. Put differently, when considered together, the
cases raise the question why a decision at one particular Time 1 or another
(whether preconception or after birth) ought to permit or foreclose recognition
of a change of mind at Time 2, given what we know about how emotions can
change during the interval and how such changes elude easy prediction.
Moreover, to the extent that gestational relationships merit exceptional respect,
as several authorities contend, 201 adoption surrenders and surrogacy both meet
Scott, supra note 188, at 113, 117, 144; see also Tamar Audi & Arlene Chang, Assembling a Global
Baby, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,2010; MADE IN INDIA (Chicken & Egg Pictures 2010).
198. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297; see also CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER:
THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 9-10 (1989) ("[A]mid the serious debate on the morality of [all varieties ofj
medical reproduction, only surrogacy has been addressed in terms of criminal norms. It occurred to me
that the reason for this was the untraditional role that women play in these arrangements."); Debra Satz,
Markets in Women's Reproductive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 117 (1992) (pointing out the
"dilemma for those who wish to use the mother-fetus bond to condemn [surrogacy] contracts while
endorsing [a woman's] right to choose abortion").
199. Compare Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1254 (asserting that state law accords equal weight to claims of
custody by mother and fathers), with id. at 1256 (justifying the different treatment of sperm donors and
surrogate mothers), and id. at 1261 n.17 (noting the continuing validity of considerations underlying the
"tender years doctrine" favoring maternal custody, despite the rejection of the doctrine itself).
200. E.g., Doe v. Clark, 457 S.E.2d 336, 337 (S.C. 1995) (concluding that the legislature intended
for consent to adoption to be obtained after the child's birth). See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1243-44.
201. E.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption ofLegitimacy in
the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 282-84 (2006); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a
Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429 (2007); see also 1. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not To Be a
Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115 (2008) (distinguishing gestational, genetic, and legal
parentage). In addition, consent to adoption by the birth mother is valid only when given after birth,
while some authorities will make a birth father's prebirth conduct determinative. E.g., John S. v. Mark
K. (In re Adoption of Michael H.), 898 P.2d 891, 898-99 (Cal. 1995); In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 823
P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992); C.F. v. D.D. (In re Adoption of B.B.D.), 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999); Laura Oren,
Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How To Determine When Putative Fathers Can Block the
Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153 (2006).
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the test-because in both contexts the woman who carried the pregnancy
changes her mind.
Yet significant differences distinguish adoption and surrogacy-
differences that would seem to allow less, not more, flexibility for a change of
mind in the latter. For one, in a case like Baby M, the promisee, here William
Stem, has something arguably more personal at stake than a prospective
202
adoptive parent. But for the agreement, he would not have provided his
semen and the child at the center of the controversy, his genetic daughter,
would never have been conceived.203 Certainly, Whitehead's failure to perform
caused him to experience regret, be it his wish that he had chosen a more
compliant surrogate or his frustration that he did not do more to ensure the
hoped-for result. Having allocated maternal rights to Whitehead, Baby M
addresses Stern's status by recognizing him, not Whitehead's husband, as the
child's legal father, thus making the issue to be resolved which custody and
visitation arrangement, as divided between Whitehead and Stem, would serve
the child's best interests. 204 Of course, shared custody was a far cry from the
plan the Sterns envisioned when they set out to have a child with Whitehead's
help.
Second, the reneging mother who planned conception with the intended
father, as in surrogacy, should call for less judicial empathy than her adoption-
surrender counterpart, whose pregnancy presumably presents an unplanned and
stressful predicament. Yet, the Baby M court is much more forgiving than the
D.N T. court and many others that must decide whether a birth mother may
revoke consent to adoption. A focus on the child's interests fails to explain this
contrasting treatment, given the absence of a consistent normative position
whether, as far as child welfare is concerned, parental rights should remain with
birth parents, on one hand, or adoptive or intended parents, on the other. 205
Returning to the idea of sexual punishment opens up the analysis in
promising ways, however. If the unaddressed regret in the adoption cases is
designed to impose an emotional burden that is the price of nonnormative
sex,206 then surrogacy cases-which use alternative insemination-would not
evoke such punitive impulses. Mary Beth Whitehead's contract might have
transgressed maternal norms or left her with "unclean hands," but she did
nothing to trigger the penalty for nonmarital sex, that is, to require regret as
redemption, in contrast to Camille in D.N. T, for example.
202. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 51.
203. See Shultz, supra note 198. This analysis, of course, begs the question of what importance
should attach to a man's genetic ties. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209
(1995).
204. 537 A.2d at 1261-64 (remanding to resolve this issue).
205. Even when focusing on child welfare, the adoption-surrender cases reveal a preference for the
adoptive parents, but Baby M privileges the claim of the birth mother.
206. See supra notes 151-163 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 282-285 and
accompanying text (examining the "price of pleasure" exacted from males).
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Shifting the focus to the intended parents provides an additional promising
avenue for exploring Baby M's decision to honor the surrogate's regret.207
From this perspective, regret operates as a regulatory tool, a vehicle for
subjecting to state control a then-maverick practice flourishing in the hands of
private parties and brokers 20 8 and for clarifying public policy. In identifying
the three principles of adoption law at odds with enforcement of the surrogacy
contract,209 Baby M contrasts surrenders in private-placement adoptions with
those arranged by state-approved or state-operated agencies. The court
emphasizes that, from the viewpoint of adoptive parents, New Jersey law
favors agency adoptions. They alone offer the assurance of irrevocable consent
by the birth parents. 210 Baby M hammers that point home: only by using state-
approved agencies and processes can risk-averse adopters protect themselves
from the possible consequences of a birth parent's change of mind. For
disappointed surrogacy promisees, such as the Stems, the costs are high,
including the inability to secure full parental rights of a genetically related
child, ongoing shared parenting with the surrogate (usually a stranger),2 and
the possibility of support obligations for a child who might spend most of his or
her time in the surrogate's custody.212 Thus, Baby M puts those like the Sterns
on notice: If you want a child to rear and you cannot produce one yourselves,
the surest path to follow is an agency adoption; private placements might not
produce the expected adoption at all; and a surrogacy arrangement could result
in a custody battle, shared parenting, and transfer payments for child support.213
In doing so, the court makes clear its deep skepticism about surrogacy and the
need for strong state regulation of an unfamiliar, and hence suspect, practice.
The resistance expressed by the Baby M court, in turn, influenced some
jurisdictions to restrict, or even ban, the practice in the wake of this famous
214
case.
This regulatory interpretation of Baby M reveals parallels to the Supreme
Court's move in Gonzales. There, the majority Justices invoke regret to
207. Other analyses seem to focus exclusively on the surrogate. E.g., Blumenthal, supra note 83, at
209-14.
208. Sanger, supra note 185; see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the
Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009).
209. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
210. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1243 (N.J. 1988).
211. Indeed, these parties did not share even a "one-night stand." See Marjorie M. Shultz, Taking
Account of ARTs in Determining Parenthood: A Troubling Dispute in California, 1 9 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 77, 102 (2005).
212. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 98-101 (1998).
213. The court says that it may decide custody based on the child's best interest without
undermining its regulatory goal: "Our declaration that this surrogacy contract is unenforceable and
illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements. We need not sacrifice the child's interests in order to
make that point sharper ... Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1257.
214. For a compilation showing each state's treatment of surrogacy today, see Darra L. Hofman,
"Mama 's Baby, Daddy 's Maybe:" A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate
Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449 (2009).
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express their reproach, indeed their disgust, at the hideousness of the banned
215abortion procedure. In Baby M, the court seizes upon regret to express its
disapproval of a new reproductive collaboration, stating: "There are, in a
civilized society, some things that money cannot buy."2 16  Although this
sentence expresses concerns about commodification of children and
exploitation of women's reproductive capacities, the subtext includes concerns
about assisted reproduction's amazing potential to disrupt the understanding of
procreation as a natural process and, in so doing, to challenge the familiar
217 -21gender order, including matemal norms of altruism and self-sacrifice.218
Mary Beth Whitehead's regret provides a toehold for retaining the legal status
quo, prioritizing reliance on state-controlled adoptions and discouraging the use
of less regulated methods of child acquisition such as those arranged by private
attorneys or surrogacy brokers. In any event, in both Gonzales and Baby M, a
professed judicial concern about regret triggers the elimination of an option that
at least some women would have chosen.
This reading of Baby M-in which regret is used to express judicial
resistance to surrogacy's challenge to the traditional conceptualization of
mothers, children, and family 219-proves all the more significant because the
case tells such an atypical story. Empirical evidence available even at the time
showed that almost all surrogacy arrangements proceeded to intended
220 221
conclusion without a hitch. Most surrogates do not change their minds.
Yet, even if the threat of reneging remains small, by imposing legal risks on the
intended parents, Baby Ms approach was designed to shape the way those
seeking help in family-making will weigh their options-adoption, surrogacy,
or neither.222
215. See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text.
216. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
217. Shultz, supra note 198, at 376-78.
218. Carol Sanger observes that in surrogacy the woman elevates her own objectives, including her
financial interests and the pleasure she experiences from being pregnant, over concern for the planned
child. Moreover, any altruism focuses on the intended parents, not the child. Sanger, supra note 114, at
462-63.
219. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial
Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1035, 1108 (2002) (reporting "public storm" and "societal debates"
sparked by surrogacy).
220. See FIELD, supra note 212, at 5, 184 n.16 (citing figures that, for the 500 children born of
surrogacy arrangements by the end of 1986, 495 of the contracts were performed without incident). For
another early study, see Susan Fischer & Irene Gillman, Surrogate Motherhood: Attachment, Attitudes
and Social Support, 54 PSYCHIATRY 13, 19 (1991) (describing Whitehead as an "anomaly").
221. The years since Baby Mhave confirmed the case as an outlier, with regret among surrogates
very rare. See, e.g., Lorillard, supra note 196, at 252; Scott, supra note 188, at 138-39. By contrast, an
estimated eighty percent of birth mothers who planned placements with prospective adoptive parents
change their minds, deciding to rear the child themselves. Andrea B. Carroll, Reregulating the Baby
Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment of Birth-Mother Living Expenses, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 315
(2011).
222. See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age ofReproductive Technology, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393 (examining reasons, including applicable laws, why individuals and couples might
find various forms of collaborative reproduction more attractive options than adoption).
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C The Case of the Accidental Father: Regret as Responsibility
In Gonzales and the next two case studies, examining adoption surrenders
and surrogacy arrangements, women play the starring roles. The gendered
portrayals of regret and its would-be causes suggest that reproductive
decisionmaking and its emotional sequelae constitute a "separate sphere," in
which men largely remain invisible. 223 Yet, other cases illustrate that men do
confront reproduction and regret, even if gender remains a highly influential
variable in the courts' construction and understanding of the issues.
In one relevant scenario, a man seeks to avoid support obligations for an
unplanned and unwanted child. These are cases of "accidental procreation"-a
phenomenon that looms large in several opinions attempting to rationalize a
marriage regime open only to male-female couples.224 To date, however, all of
these child-support disputes have involved unmarried parents, with the most
noteworthy alleging what we might call birth-control fraud or semen
225
misappropriation by the mothers and seeking what the fathers call a right to a
"financial abortion" or a "Roe v. Wade for men." 226 The arguments of these
men never prevail, no matter how intense their regret and how plausible their
223. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 5, at 2029 ("[In the area of reproductive rights] the law has
been surprisingly frank in acknowledging the role of emotion .... Yet emotion here is not treated as a
pervasive, inevitable human attribute: in a move reminiscent of earlier dichotomies, legal actors
associate emotion exclusively and restrictively with women . . . .").
224. Kerry Abrams & Peter Brooks, Marriage as a Message: Same-Sex Couples and the Rhetoric
of Accidental Procreation, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2009); Edward Stein, The "Accidental
Procreation" Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 403 (2009); see also, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and
Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 385-86 (2011) (explaining that such
cases concern the role of marriage in procreation).
225. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, 2005 WL 4694579 (111. App. Ct. 2005); Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d
682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997); L. Pamela P. v. Frank
S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983); see also Jill E. Evans, In Search of Paternal Equity: A Father's Right
To Pursue a Claim of Misrepresentation of Fertility, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1045 (2005) (supporting the
rejection of tort claims by such men); Donald C. Hubin, Daddy Dilemmas: Untangling the Puzzles of
Paternity, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 29, 52-61 (2003) (using the term "purloined sperm" in
discussing cases in which the woman appropriated the man's sperm for use without the man's consent);
Brenda Saiz, Tort Law: Tort Liability When Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Birth Control
Results in the Birth of a Healthy Child-Wallis v. Smith, 32 N.M. L. REV. 549 (2002) (supporting the
rejection of privacy-based and tort claims in deference to the child's interests).
226. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, A Man's Right To Choose (an Abortion)? Men Deserve Voice in
Abortion Decision, 18 LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005; John Tierney, Men's Abortion Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2006, at A25; see also, e.g., Melanie G. McCulley, The Male Abortion: The Putative Father's
Right To Terminate His Interests In and Obligations to the Unborn Child, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 39 (1998)
(proposing a model statute "recogniz[ing] the inequity existing between the female's ability to choose
whether she will be responsible for her child, without interference from the putative father, and the
putative father's inability to make the same choice"); Sarah E. Rudolph, Inequities in the Current
Judicial Analysis of Misrepresentation of Fertility Claims, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331 (criticizing case
law that allows women to sue for misrepresentation of fertility by men but disallows such suits by men
against women); Christopher Bruno, Note, A Right To Decide Not To Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v.
Carhart and the Acceptance ofEmotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 141 (2008) (contending that unwanted declarations of legal paternity undermine the right to
procreational autonomy of men).
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claims of unfairness. Instead, courts invoke a principle of "personal
responsibility" for the consequences of the man's sexual activities, suggesting a
notion of "regret as responsibility" or "the responsibility model of regret."
Matthew Dubay's case, Dubay v. Wells,227 epitomizes these controversies.
Dubay asserted that he had made clear before sexual intercourse with Lauren
Wells his desire not to become a father and had relied on her assurances that
she was infertile and was using contraception as an extra precautionary
measure.228 Wells became pregnant, however, and chose to carry the
pregnancy to term, joining with the county to seek a paternity order and child
229
support after Dubay maintained his refusal to become a father.
Dubay unsuccessfully pursued in federal court two equal protection
challenges to the paternity and child-support statutes and their application to
him, arguing that these laws discriminate on the basis of gender. First, Dubay
contended, abortion permits women to disclaim legal parenthood following
consensual intercourse, while men have no similar option.230 Second, he cited
adoption-relinquishment and "safe haven" laws,231 which provide an additional
woman-controlled opportunity for extricating oneself from parental
responsibility.232 To eliminate the discrimination and ensure men a comparable
constitutional right to decide whether to bear or beget a child that women
enjoy, Dubay contended that he should be able to disclaim legal fatherhood and
the support obligations the status entails. Translated into the language of
reproduction and regret, the argument is that men ought to have the same
opportunity as women to actualize, post-conception, their regret.
Invoking an earlier case that had rejected similar claims sounding in
substantive due process,233 the district court dismissed Dubay's challenges.234
At bottom, the district court found no state action, required for a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, in the child's conception or the individual decisions leading
to that result.235 Reaching the same result as the district court, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit saw neither a fundamental right at stake nor
discrimination based on gender, so it upheld the Michigan Paternity Act and its
resulting child support obligations for Dubay as gender-neutral, rational
227. 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007).
228. Id. at 426.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 428.
231. On safe haven laws, see, for example, Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned
Babies, Lost Fathers: Dangers in Safe Haven Laws, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 335 (2006); Carol Sanger,
Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 753 (2006); Lucinda J.
Cornett, Note, Remembering the Endangered "Child": Limiting the Definition of "Safe Haven" and
Looking beyond the Safe Haven Law Framework, 98 KY. L.J. 833 (2010).
232. 506 F.3d at 428.
233. N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 2004).
234. Dubay v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404,410 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
235. Id. ("[T]he State played no role in the conception or birth of the child in this case, or in the
decisions that resulted in the birth of the child.").
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responses to legitimate state interests. Both courts made clear that Dubay has
no one but himself to blame for his predicament. 236 Put differently, any distress
that Dubay might feel about his unwanted fatherhood ought to be understood as
regret directed at his own decisions to engage in sexual intercourse and not to
use (additional) birth control.237
There's quite a bit worth mining here. First, surely the court of appeals
correctly rejects the district court's effort to identify biology alone as the basis
of Dubay's paternity and resulting obligations.238 Paternity is a species of
parentage, a legal construction; even parentage laws based on biology reflect a
choice made by the state.239 Any doubts that the operative variables include far
more than what the district court understands as "biological fact"240 evaporate
once one widens the focus to consider the full range of parentage rules. (These
include several doctrines that reach well beyond genetics, such as the
traditional presumption of legitimacy,241 the "biology-plus" requirement
imposed on unmarried birth fathers who seek to prevent the mother's surrender
of a child for adoption,242 and the emerging recognition of same-sex couples as
parents, without the need for an adoption proceeding. 243)
Second, a thought experiment applying Gonzales's approach to such
scenarios provides no answer but instead emphasizes Gonzales's flawed
reasoning. Protecting the Dubays of the world from the regret they might
experience would give rise to a rule that bans all sexual intercourse by men
who do not wish to be fathers, unless they use condoms or have undergone a
previous vasectomy. Indeed, that such contraceptive measures occasionally fail
means that no penis-in-vagina intercourse can be fully regret-proof.244 At the
236. See id.; Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430 (rejecting Dubay's asserted equal protection "right to initiate
consensual sexual activity while choosing to not be a parent").
237. Dubay, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11 (citing Hedges, 391 F.3d at 834). The court also invokes the
following reasoning of the Hawaii Supreme Court: "'[T]he father elected a course of conduct
inconsistent with the exercise of his right not to beget a child. The reproductive consequences of his
actions were imposed by the operation of nature, not statute."' Id. (quoting Child Support Enforcement
Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005)).
238. Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430 n.4.
239. See, e.g., JAMEs G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 26 (2006); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 61-62 (2008).
240. Dubay, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 414.
241. E.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I10 (1989).
242. E.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). See Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads:
Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 827-28 (2006) (reviewing case
law from the Supreme Court that ties fathers' rights to demonstrated commitment and establishes a
"biology-plus" standard); Daniel C. Zinman, Note, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right To
Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 971, 975, 980 (1992) (using the term
"biology plus" to describe the criteria for constitutionally protected paternal rights in the Supreme
Court's case law).
243. E.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 908 (2011);
Elisa B. v. Superior Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
244. As Judith Jarvis Thomson wrote in her classic article defending abortion, a woman's
consistent use of birth control or sexual abstinence would not suffice to eliminate all risks of unwanted
pregnancy, given that "anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway
never leaving home without a (reliable!) army." Thomson, supra note 71, at 59.
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very least, if abortion precedents are relevant, then detailed state-scripted
warnings ("informed consent" requirements)245 about the financial
consequences should precede all sexual intercourse by men seeking to avoid
fatherhood. Even with new attacks on contraception and its providers, 46 no one
247
would seriously recommend such measures, which infringe sexual privacy
and depart from conventional social and legal assumptions about the value of
male sexual freedom.248
Moreover, the question that Dubay raises has surfaced in other contexts.
For example, some birth fathers attempting to block adoption relinquishments
of infants have unsuccessfully challenged the inequality of a regime that
disallows birth mothers from giving binding consent to adoption before birth
but makes birth fathers' prebirth conduct decisive, as some states do249 Yet
behind such particularized illustrations lurks an argument that, at first, bears an
arresting resemblance to two familiar theories for (women's) abortion freedom.
Under the first of these theories, advanced by Sylvia Law, abortion
restrictions disproportionately punish women for heterosexual conduct,
250
compared to males. A germ of this argument appeared earlier when, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on access to
birth control for unmarried individuals, noting how the law imposed
disproportionate penalties on women, namely possible pregnancy and all the
accompanying social baggage, especially outside of marriage.251 Access to
contraception and abortion allows women to avoid pregnancy as a consequence
of heterosexual intercourse-a risk that men never face. Dubay and the
regretful birth fathers try to press an analogous point when they contend that
the state has chosen to exacerbate the biological differences between men and
252
women when it should have elected equalizing measures instead.
245. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (joint
opinion) (concluding that Pennsylvania's detailed pre-abortion "informed consent" requirement is
constitutional). In Casey, the joint opinion invoked the possibility of post-abortion regret to justify this
required information, rather than to eliminate an option altogether, as in Gonzales. See supra note 32
(quoting the opinion).
246. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Budget Feud Ropes In Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
2011, at 16; Russell Shorto, Contra-Contraception, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 7, 2006, at 48.
247. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
248. Frances Olsen exposes this value with a telling hypothetical law purportedly designed to
protect the "potential life" of sperm; as she writes, "Only [men's] convenience prevents us from valuing
sperm." Frances Olsen, Comment: Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REV. 105, 130 (1989).
249. See supra note 201.
250. Law, supra note 20, at 1016 ("When the state denies women access to abortion, both nature
and the state impose upon women burdens of unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear."); Sylvia Law,
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 225 (1988).
251. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972).
252. The father in N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir. 2004) (cited in Dubay v. Wells,
506 F.3d 422, 429-30 (6th Cir. 2007)), most clearly advances this argument. 391 F.3d at 834-35. In turn,
opponents of legal abortion contend that the principle of gender equality does not require the right to
choose abortion, because "[m]en ... have no right to avoid the responsibilities of fatherhood once a
child is conceived." Brief for United States Conference of Catholic Bishops And Other Religious
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Reva Siegel and others have developed a second equality-based theory for
abortion freedom. Although biology dictates the different contributions that
males and females make to human reproduction, law and culture ascribe
meanings and expectations to these contributions. Outlawing or restricting
abortion conscripts women to lives, identities, and responsibilities of
motherhood, with all its social burdens and with profound consequences for the
other paths such women might choose to pursue. 253 Using a parallel argument,
Dubay takes aim at the forced fatherhood that he finds in the paternity statute
and its support obligations.
Gender stereotypes provide an important subtext here. Law's and Siegel's
arguments derive their power from the social meaning of motherhood, as later
254
elaborations have underscored. In addition, at least when this line of
reasoning made its debut, family law had only begun to address unmarried
fathers' possible obligations to their children-a topic that the national
preoccupation with "deadbeat dads" has now transformed into vibrant legal
255terrain. Yet, even now, the gender scripts that make motherhood so
enveloping256 have not migrated to our understanding of fatherhood. As the
generalizations in both Gonzales and Baby M suggest, motherhood defines
womanhood.257  Men, by contrast, have identities separate from any role as
fathers.258 Indeed, for fatherhood, the script remains largely centered on
economic obligation, with child support understood as "a tax fathers have had
to pay in Western civilization." 259 Indeed, the Supreme Court has conceded as
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16 n.14, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2006) (No. 05-380).
253. Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). For the costs of such arguments, see West,
supra note 80, at 1409-10; Ziegler, supra note 191.
254. Compare Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,342-43
(2007) (positing two rights to abortion), with Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality,
Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (2010) (arguing that
pregnancy constitutes a unitary experience, with reproductive bodily integrity and motherhood
inextricably connected).
255. See e.g., Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a)(3) (2011); Solangel
Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991 (2006); David Ray Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat Dads, and American Poverty, 26 W.
NEw ENG. L. REV. 9 (2004).
256. This is especially so in today's era of "intensive parenting." See Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger,
Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1271-73 (2011); see also AMY CHUA, BATTLE HYMN OF
THE TIGER MOTHER (2011) (presenting a law professor's popular account of her own intensive
mothering of her daughters); Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. I (2005)
(noting political and liberatory possibilities when nontraditional caregivers perform this function).
257. See supra notes 71, 187-191 and accompanying text.
258. See Nevada Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (explaining the Family
and Medical Leave Act, the Court observes: "Stereotypes about women's domestic roles are reinforced
by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men."); see also Elizabeth A.
Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting Reproductive Rights, 5
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 147, 183 (1996) (criticizing the judicial treatment of male fertility as
an individual right or interest but "female fertility as a subject of concern to others, including society,
and thus more appropriately subject to external controls").
259. N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004).
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much-notwithstanding its doctrine of gender equality-by minimizing the
personal interests a man has at stake in a paternity determination.260 And, as
the statutory scheme in Dubay illustrates, forced fatherhood as a legal matter
entails only required transfer payments, nothing more.261
This understanding of legal fatherhood simply as a source of economic
support illuminates the "legitimate government purpose" 262 invoked by the
court of appeals in Dubay. The phrase refers to the policy of personal
responsibility, which conceptualizes sexual intercourse as the but-for cause of a
child's financial needs.263 At least two federal statutes bear the name of this
policy, the "Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Opportunity Act
of 1996," enacted to reform welfare,264 and a provision creating a federally
funded program of comprehensive sex education, "Personal Responsibility
Education," enacted in 2010.265 The policy of personal responsibility assumes
child support must be a private matter, even a "private tragedy,"266 but not a
state responsibility, and that-absent other private alternatives-the price of
sexual pleasure is the risk of a child support obligation.267 The legal
irrelevance of Dubay's regret, then, comes close to the construction of sex
apparent in some of the adoption-surrender cases under the redemption
model.268 Recall how the D.N.T court condemns the young birth mother
Camille for the "bad decisions [she] has made her entire life." 269 In Dubay, the
260. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (holding that due process does not require heightened
procedural safeguards for establishing parentage, despite a paternity defendant's stake in avoiding an
erroneous determination, even though such safeguards are required in terminations of parental rights).
At one time some courts saw every birth, even of an unplanned child, as a blessing. See
Chrisenten v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (Minn. 1934) ("[T]he plaintiff has been blessed with the
fatherhood of another child."). But see Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 667 P.2d 1294
(Ariz. 1983) (allowing recovery for wrongful pregnancy, but offset by the benefits of having a healthy
child).
261. See Appleton, supra note 239, at 35-36. Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011)
(requiring fair procedures, although not necessarily appointed counsel, before the incarceration of a
father held in contempt for failure to pay child support). Of course, parentage is a legally created status.
See authorities cited supra note 239. But see Cohen, supra note 201, at 1125 (positing the concept of
"attributional parenthood" that culture and society recognize apart from law).
262. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422,430(6th Cir. 2007).
263. See, e.g., Scott Altman, A Theory of Child Support, 17 INT'L J.L., POL'Y & FAM. 173 (2003)
(exploring theoretical bases of child support obligations); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REv. 649 (2008) (same); Ira Mark Eliman & Tara O'Toole
Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 107, 129 (2008) (same). Cf AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002) (recognizing parents by estoppel).
264. Pub. L.No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction
Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)).
265. 42 U.S.C.A. § 713 (2011). Cf Separate Program for Abstinence Education, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 710 (2011).
266. Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 3 (2010).
267. See also Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011) (proposing recognition of
additional financial obligations between unmarried lovers when conception results from sexual
intercourse, with tax reform for implementation).
268. See supra notes 109-177 and accompanying text.
269. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690, 709 (Miss. 2003).
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district court strikes a similar pose, saying, "The consequences of sexual
intercourse have always included conception, and the State has nothing to do
with this historical truism." 270 Likewise, as the court of appeals puts it, Dubay
has no equal protection "right to initiate consensual sexual activity while
choosing to not be a parent." 271 Under this responsibility model, law makes
Dubay "own" his decision-although such external pressure no doubt limits the
opportunities for personal growth that the psychoanalytic literature would find
in regret. 272
This idea-that men must support nonmarital offspring-took hold in the
1970s, after the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a string of laws
disadvantaging children classified as "illegitimate." 273  Before that time, a
nonmarital child was "filius nullius" or "filius populi,"274 with unmarried
fathers often excluded from the legal category of "parent." 275 Although many
of the Court's rulings focused on fairness to children born outside marriage and
the injustice of punishing them for their parents' failure to comply with the
276marital norm, the public fisc stood to gain as well from the privatization of
dependency. Today, the conversation has shifted dramatically from the
equality-based roots of the Court's illegitimacy cases to a much more explicit
emphasis on relieving government from supporting needy children. A father's
marital status is irrelevant to his child support responsibilities, 277 and ever more
carefully crafted enforcement tools seek to collect ever larger fractions of the
obligations due.278 Child support enforcement today entails a costly
bureaucracy and the project sometimes seems quixotic,279 but adherence to the
notion of "personal responsibility" overpowers such practical considerations.
Against this background, given the underlying assumptions that child
support must be a private parental responsibility and that every child must have
270. Dubay, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
271. Dubay, 506 F.3d at 430 (quoting plaintiffs brief).
272. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
273. E.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
274. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *454-59.
275. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). For a critical discussion of such
discrimination, see generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971)
(calling for an end to such discrimination).
276. E.g., Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
277. E.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 925 A.2d 1086 (Conn. 2007); Jackson v. Proctor, 801 A.2d 1080 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
278. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 664 (2011) (authorizing the interception of tax refunds due to delinquent
obligors); id at § 666(a)(16) (2011) (conditioning states' receipt of federal funds on procedures for
withholding, suspending, or restricting delinquent obligors' licenses).
279. See, e.g., State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001), reconsideration denied and opinion
clarified, 635 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002); see generally Papke, supra
note 255. Both Oakley and Papke's analysis of this case highlight the futility of pursuing private support
in some situations. See also Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the
Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007)
(detailing how child support policies are not successful and harm children and their families).
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two parents, Dubay's victory could have come only at the detriment of the
child 280-so one could say that the courts reached the correct result in denying
Dubay's attempt to opt out of fatherhood. This emphasis on a third party-here,
the child-tracks those authorities concluding that the legal relevance of regret
in modern contract law often depends less on the actions of the promisor or
obligor and more on the reliance or disadvantage of another.28 1
Others, returning the focus to gender and equality, invoke basic fairness for
imposing responsibilities on men like Dubay. For example, Shari Motro looks
beyond the courts' rulings, recommending legal recognition of the financial
obligations that men should share apart from child support, including the costs
of the pregnancy itself (and any employment consequences for the woman) and
the costs of abortion. Motro, who contends that women should not bear these
costs alone, makes explicit her understanding of the source of such financial
obligations for men, calling them "the price of pleasure." 282 Although Motro
considers only monetary costs, her evocative phrase could be read more
expansively, offering an apt reference to the emotional burden-the regret-
left for men like Dubay to experience.
Read against the case law, the "price of pleasure" rationale apparently
applies even when the male is so young that he is considered a victim of
statutory rape.283 It also extends to cases of "purloined sperm," in which the
man took affirmative steps to minimize his procreative risk by participating in
heterosexual intercourse with a condom or engaging only in oral sex, but the
woman used the sperm he released in the encounter to inseminate herself and
conceive.284 Even here, his efforts notwithstanding, the man owes child
support, although he might be able to recover damages for his emotional
distress.285
Even if compelling, the reasoning that the child's right to support should
trump all other considerations does not apply in several settings in which
conception occurs by assisted reproduction, however.286 Here, law sometimes
makes room for second thoughts or regret. Further, with assisted reproduction,
280. See also L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y. 1983) (using similar reasoning).
281. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 51, at 38.
282. Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 917 (2010); see also Motro, supra
note 267.
283. In re Paternity of K.B., 104 P.3d 1132 (Okla. Ct. App. 2004); see also S.F. v. State ex rel.
T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (finding that the man was liable for child support even
though he was unconscious during the sex act, making that act sexual assault).
284. For an example of such allegations, see State v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
For use of the term "purloined sperm," see Hubin, supra note 225, at 52. For a critique of the prevailing
approach, see Michael J. Higdon, Fatherhood by Conscription: Nonconsensual Insemination and the
Duty ofChild Support, 46 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
285. Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (111. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005) (reversing
dismissal of the plaintiffs emotional distress claim). But see, e.g., Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a man's tort claim for economic injury).
286. See Higdon, supra note 284.
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law not only tolerates solo-parent families but sometimes requires them,
notwithstanding the objection of an eager-to-be-involved genetic father who
regrets his failure to take the necessary steps for recognition as a legal parent.
Even if the child's rights to equal treatment and support fail to explain such
divergent outcomes, the "price of pleasure" theory could provide a rationale for
distinguishing cases of sexual encounters from those based on assisted
reproduction, as shown in the following case studies.
The case studies in the next two subsections explore these contrasts. In
doing so, these case studies allow us to test three tentative conclusions that
have emerged so far about the courts' various treatments of regret. First, the
gender of the reproductive decisionmaker shapes the understanding to a large
extent. Second, the discourse and results conflate sexual intercourse (and other
sexual encounters) with sexual pleasure. Finally, in naturalizing regret and
conceptualizing the regret-inducing dilemma or choice as a problem entirely of
the subject's own making, the courts fail to acknowledge the role of law-
although legal rules not only validate or invalidate regret but also frame it,
impose it, and reinforce it. Although one would not necessarily expect courts,
given their limited third-branch role, to refashion otherwise controlling
legislation, nonetheless these courts sometimes must interpret statutes with
considerable wiggle room (as in D.N.T.),287 must create common law from
scratch (as in Baby M), or must respond to constitutional challenges (as in
Gonzales and Dubay). In exercising such authority, these courts envision law
either as a reason to leave a party as they find her or him, with regret as a
seemingly natural burden to bear, or they treat law as a means of relieving
regret, but they never consider law as a possible source of regret itself,
advancing the state's own regulatory agenda.
D. Controlling Frozen Preembryos: Regret as Reconsideration
These preliminary insights about gender, sex, and law's role gain depth
through the analysis of a scenario in which-as in Baby M-the courts have
had an opportunity to write upon a relatively clean slate. Here, the progenitors
of frozen embryos dispute their appropriate disposition at some later time. In
such controversies, emerging rules of contemporaneous consent validate regret,
privileging reproductive second thoughts over earlier decisions and
commitments. This approach, which we might call "regret as reconsideration"
or which we might think about as "the reconsideration model of regret,"
contrasts sharply with the responsibility model in Dubay. This difference, then,
limits to cases of sexual intercourse (or a sexual encounter with another) any
287. For a view of the wiggle room inherent in these statutes, see the concurring and dissenting
opinions in that case. 843 So. 2d 690, 712 (Miss. 2003) (Cobb, J., concurring); id. at 716 (McRae, J.,
dissenting).
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general principle that a male risks legal fatherhood and child support
obligations each time he ejaculates, regret notwithstanding.
The disputes that provide this lens for examining regret arise because the
refinement of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) has produced a
medical protocol that includes a woman's drug-induced superovulation, the
surgical collection of numerous ova from her body as well as a man's provision
of semen via ejaculation in a cup, the mixing of such genetic materials to
facilitate fertilization in vitro (IVF), and-most significantly for purposes of
this case study-the cryopreservation of any (often many) preembryos not
288immediately transferred to the woman for implantation. Sometimes those
who created the frozen preembryos develop different preferences over time,
frequently because of changing family circumstances. In one common fact
pattern, the couple who created the preembryos during marriage disagree about
their disposition upon divorce or separation, with the former wife typically
seeking to use them to produce children while the husband seeks to destroy
them or donate them for scientific research. Men have usually won in these
disputes,289 despite several compelling arguments why the woman might
prevail (the teleology of the original effort, her greater "sweat equity" in
making the embryos, and the different effect of the passage of time on women's
fertility, compared to men' s).290 Several courts have balanced the competing
interests and decided that the right to avoid parenthood trumps the right to
procreate, even with one's own genetic material.291
Against this background, a number of authorities signaled early on that
agreements entered by the parties and the clinics at the time of the initial lVF
procedure would prevent litigation by directing in advance the subsequent
288. As the result of such practices, "as of 2003 there were slightly less than 400,000 cryopreserved
preembryos in storage in the United States . . . ." Cohen, supra note 201, at 1118. In contrast to the
United States, some other countries, such as Italy, avoid this problem by limiting the number of embryos
created and requiring immediate use of them all. See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Embryo
Fundamentalism, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1015, 1051 (2010); Urska Velikonja, Note, The
Costs of Multiple Gestation Pregnancies in Assisted Reproduction, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 463, 494-
95 (2009).
289. E.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992).
290. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581
(App. Div. 1997), aff'd, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is
Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1063 (1996); Anne Dochin, Toward a Gender-Sensitive
Assisted Reproduction Policy, 23 BIOETHICS 28 (2009); Tracey S. Pachman, Disputes Over Frozen
Preembryos & the "Right Not To Be a Parent," 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 128 (2003); John A.
Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989 (2001);
see also Nahmani v. Nahmani, C.F.H. 2401/95 (ruling in favor of the woman in this Israeli case because,
inter alia, she would have no other opportunity for genetic motherhood); Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-
Embryos and the Right To Change One's Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 75, 79 (2002) (discussing
Nahmani).
291. E.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588; Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768; see also J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707
(N.J. 2001) (determining that the balance tips in favor of the former wife, who in this case did not want
the embryos to be used for procreation).
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disposition of the preembryos. That is, these authorities saw "pre-
commitments" as a means of resolving future disputes and eliminating the need
to rely on post-hoc judicial balancing.293
Not so, decided the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in A.Z v.
294B.Z,24 a case with the typical facts described above. In this case, the spouses
had previously entered an agreement (though not one free from questions)295
stating that, in the event of the couple's separation, the preembryos would go to
the former wife for implantation. The court declined to enforce the agreement.
Embracing an analysis championed by Carl Coleman296 and departing from a
then-emerging conventional wisdom, the opinion in A.Z. emphasizes the
importance of being able to change one's mind in family matters. The opinion
surveys a variety of legal developments, from the abolition in many
jurisdictions of the cause of action for breach of promise to marry to the
establishment of a four-day post-birth waiting period for infant surrenders for
adoption, and then concludes:
We glean from these [authorities] that prior agreements to enter into
familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced
against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions. This
enhances the "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and
family life." 297
Under one reading, AZ. tracks those past cases that expressly balanced
competing interests.298 Without explicitly articulating a balance, A.Z. signals
that the interest of one who wishes to avoid a familial relationship should
always prevail, regardless of prior agreements. According to A.Z.'s stated
reasoning, however, autonomy gives regret its legal force and makes the case
for reconsideration. This rationale for a requirement of contemporaneous
mutual consent nonetheless remains controversial. For example, John
Robertson, a consistent advocate for procreative liberty in all its
292. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
293. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House (And the Business):
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1180-83 (2009).
294. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
295. Here, the court points out a number of problems with the alleged agreement, which was a form
provided by the clinic and which the wife had the husband sign in blank. Further, it was not a separation
agreement nor did it unambiguously apply upon divorce. 725 N.E.2d at 1053-54, 1056-57.
296. Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights
Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1999); see A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055 n.13.
297. 725 N.E.2d at 1059. The court then cites Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974)). A footnote, however,
limits the holding: "We express no view regarding whether an unambiguous agreement between two
donors concerning the disposition of frozen preembryos could be enforced over the contemporaneous
objection of one of the donors, when such agreement contemplated destruction or donation of the
preembryos either for research or implantation in a surrogate." 725 N.E.2d at 1058 n.22.
298. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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299instantiations, argues that autonomy values cut the other way. According to
Robertson, "[a] main argument for enforcing precommitments for disposition
of frozen embryos is the importance of the freedom that it provides individuals
at Time A to control or restrain future reproductive choices at Time B." 300 As
Jeremy Blumenthal points out, the competing autonomy-based claims pose "the
question of which is a party's 'true' feeling: that expressed at Time], at the time
of the advance agreement, or that expressed at Time 2, the time at which a
contemporaneous decision must be made." 301 Given the data on the inaccuracy
of affective forecasting, Blumenthal would go with the Time 2 preference,302 as
in A.Z and in contrast to Robertson. 303
But why stop at Time 2? If people tend to look ahead inaccurately, then
they might also look back inaccurately; hindsight might even distort judgment.
Moreover, at Time 3 even a Time 2 choice might be experienced as regrettable,
even more regrettable than the Time 1 decision.
Bracketing such questions and following any reading, however, AZ.
diverges from Dubay, in which a man's post-ejaculation regret counts for
nothing. The divergence is all the more striking to the extent that autonomy
remains an influential value because in Dubay, by hypothesis, the parenthood-
averse party made his position clear at the outset, so his regret reflects no
change of mind, while in A.Z the embryos exist only because the party now
seeking to avoid parenthood participated in their creation and did so with only
one imaginable purpose, reproduction.304 Put differently, according greater
299. E.g., JOHk A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 4 (1994).
300. Robertson, supra note 290, at 1038-39. In addition, Robertson notes, enforcement of
precommitments promotes efficiency, relieving the courts of the burden of resolving such controversies.
Id. at 1039. See, e.g., Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006); Cahill v. Cahill, 757 So. 2d
465 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); see also In re Marriage of
Dahl, 194 P.3d 834 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (enforcing a provision designating the divorcing wife as
decisionmaker). For additional support of a contractual approach, see Sara D. Petersen, Comment,
Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos Upon Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving
Party Expectations, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1065 (2002-2003); Amanda J. Smith, J.B. v. M.B.: New Evidence
that Contracts Need To Be Reevaluated As the Method of Choice for Resolving Frozen Embryo
Disputes, 81 N.C. L. REV. 878 (2002-2003); Karissa Hostrup Windsor, Note, Disposition of
Cryopreserved Preembryos After Divorce, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (2002-2003).
301. Blumenthal, supra note 83, at 217.
302. Id.
303. Glenn Cohen stakes out a middle ground, urging a default rule of non-use or a right to avoid
genetic parenthood, subject to individual waiver in advance, while leaving open the possibility of more
nuanced rules applicable when one party has no other opportunity to become a genetic parent. Cohen,
supra note 20 1.
304. True, one can imagine that one spouse agreed primarily to humor or mollify the other, with
more consequential negotiations and the ultimate decision put off until later. Cf In re Marriage of
Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 294 n.22 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding the former husband to be the child's
father, over his objections, and observing: "And while it may be true that John's consent to the
fertilization, implantation and pregnancy was done as an accommodation to allow Luanne to surmount a
formality, who knows what relationship he may develop with Jaycee in the future? Human relationships
are not static; things done merely to help one individual overcome a perceived legal obstacle sometimes
become much more meaningful.").
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deference to the purposeful progenitor's Time 2 preference to avoid parenthood
while ignoring the unintended progenitor's similar and ongoing preference
seems counterintuitive under an autonomy rationale. 305
Further, whatever weight Dubay places on the interests of other parties-
whether the child, the mother, or the public fisc 30 6 -the cases like A.Z. do not
find such concerns compelling. In A.Z., of course, the former wife had wanted
to use the preembryos, consistent with the provisions of the agreement. In an
even more telling illustration from the European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber, Natalie Evans sought to preserve her fertility in the face of a
diagnosis of precancerous tumors, which would require the removal of her
ovaries. Upon medical advice that frozen unfertilized ova have a lower
reproductive success rate than frozen fertilized ova,308 Evans's partner, J.,
agreed to provide semen for IVF, which produced six preembryos that were
frozen for future use. Pursuant to British law, which requires contemporaneous
mutual consent, both Evans and J. were advised that either could withdraw
consent to use the preembryos at any time. After the parties' relationship
deteriorated, J. withdrew consent and asked that the preembryos be destroyed.
Evans sued, claiming that contemporaneous-consent requirement violated the
Human Rights Convention by imposing an obstacle to her last and only
opportunity to procreate with her own genetic material.309 A majority of the
Grand Chamber ruled against her, upholding the application of the requirement
of contemporaneous mutual consent. Presumably, given British law, the same
result would follow even if the original agreement had specified that Evans
would be able to control the preembryos.
Of course, Dubay and the frozen-embryo cases are not identical. Yet, any
two situations differ, and the question becomes which differences law chooses
to make important. One immediately apparent distinction focuses on
pregnancy: Matthew Dubay lost the opportunity to actualize his post-
ejaculation regret, that is, to reconsider, once Lauren Wells became pregnant,
and her physical integrity prevented him from doing anything to halt his
becoming a father. Yet a woman's physical integrity is not entirely irrelevant
in the frozen-embryo cases, as Natalie Evans's predicament poignantly
illustrates. Put differently, should sexual conception and alternative methods of
conception in which no pregnancy has yet occurred necessarily give rise to
such different legal responses? 310 Instead of emphasizing pregnancy, law could
305. See Strasser, supra note 293, at 1192-93.
306. See supra notes 227-285 and accompanying text.
307. Evans v. United Kingdom (No. 6339/05), 2007-XV Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber.
308. Technological advances might have begun to ameliorate this problem. See Jennifer Ludden,
Egg Freezing Puts Biological Clockon Hold (NPR radio broadcast May 31, 2011).
309. Evans invoked Articles 2, 8, 12, and 14 of the Human Rights Act. Evans v. United Kingdom
(No. 6339/05), 2007-XV Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber.
310. Likewise, in both settings, the prevailing legal principle appears to preserve the status quo-be
it the pregnancy or the absence of pregnancy, although pregnancy itself always presents a self-executing
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choose to emphasize the actor's purpose-which was definitely not conception
in Dubay but was in AZ. 3 1 From this perspective, binding the actor only in the
former case is not the only plausible approach.
These observations, in turn, invite two possible explanations. First, a
public policy against "forced parenthood" arguably supports outcomes like
those in A.Z. and Evans.312  Of course, that was one of the arguments
unsuccessfully advanced in Dubay, albeit overwhelmed not only by respect for
the pregnant woman's control over her body but also by the strength of the
policy that keeps dependency private.3 13 These cases ignore the possibility that
genetic parentage need not entail legal parentage and its economic obligations.
Thus, a legal rule that takes effect before the transfer of the cryopreserved
embryos for gestation arguably obviates the problem presented in Dubay. In
other words, this rule is efficient for a state preoccupied with "deadbeat dads":
no child, no support-no enforcement difficulties.
Second, this case study offers a positive test of the hypothesis that
unaddressed regret might operate as a "price of pleasure" exacted for sexual
encounters.314 Surrendering birth mothers and accidental fathers deserve to feel
regret; they all presumably conceived sexually. The same is likely true for
aborting women-though sometimes law may purport to protect them even
while promoting regret. Apparently, any sexual encounter with another counts,
whether oral sex, sex with a condom, or even unconscious sex,315 but the
masturbation necessary for men to provide semen for assisted reproduction
does not. Those who do not conceive sexually, surrogate mothers and those
who created frozen embryos, do not merit this regret penalty. Medical
intervention apparently purifies the reproductive process in such situations: no
sex, no pleasure-no problem.
challenge to the status quo. Moreover, under the British version of the contemporaneous consent
requirement, one party's objection to the use of the embryos compels their destruction, not the
maintenance of the status quo. Id. at para. 19.
311. This was precisely the path that Baby M declined to follow. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227,1248-49 (N.J. 1988); Shultz, supra note 198, at 323 (criticizing Baby M: "Within the context of
artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and
bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood."). Alternatively, law could emphasize
the comparative opportunities for future reproduction, in light of health crises like Natalie Evans's
illness or women's decreasing fertility as they age. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
312. See Cohen, supra note 201 (arguing for recognition of the right not to be a genetic parent, but
concluding the right should be subject to waiver in advance). But see Susan B. Apel, Cryopreserved
Embryos: A Response to "Forced Parenthood" and the Role of Intent, 39 FAM. L.Q. 663, 675 (2005)
(arguing that a lack of present intent should not defeat parenthood for one who purposely contributed to
the creation of frozen embryos at an earlier time); Ellen Waldman, The Parent Trap: Uncovering the
Myth of "Coerced Parenthood" in Frozen Embryo Disputes, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1021, 1030 (2004)
(arguing "that the burdens of 'forced parenthood' usually claimed by men -are not sufficiently
weighty, and that the investments of the procreation-seeking party-usually the woman-are not
sufficiently weak tojustify" consistent judicial rulings in favor of the former).
313. See supra notes 223-285 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 267-287 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 225, 283-285 and accompanying text.
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The cases, then, line up to yield a sex/no sex distinction. Accordingly, they
reveal the limits of Lawrence v. Texas and Eisenstadt v. Baird' 7 before it, to
the extent that both might have promised protection for sexual activities outside
marriage.
E. Sperm Donation: Regret as Respect
The divide between the sex and no-sex cases gains additional strength in
disputes about the status of sperm donors for alternative insemination.3 These
disputes show that family law does not invariably attach significance to genetic
ties-even when doing so would address regret and also would advance the
state interest in ensuring private support for already born children. Instead,
these cases often elevate respect for advance agreements, whether express or
implied from a default rule, over competing values. A pair of cases arising
from alternative insemination with the sperm of a known donor exemplifies
what I call "regret as respect" or the "respect model of regret."
In In re K.MH.,31 a divided Kansas Supreme Court applied and upheld a
state statute treating a sperm provider as "not the birth father," absent a written
agreement to the contrary with the woman. In this case, Daryl Hendrix (a gay
man reportedly hopeful about the opportunity to become a parent) alleged an
oral understanding with a friend, Samantha Harrington (an attorney), that he
would provide sperm to her for insemination; according to Hendrix's version of
the facts, they agreed that he would be involved in the resulting child's life, and
she assured him that they need not put anything in writing.320 Despite his
original misunderstanding of the law (at Time 1), his subsequent regret (at
Time 2), and his constitutional challenges to the statute (which he took all the
way to the United States Supreme Court),321 Hendrix's failure to secure a
written agreement from Harrington naming him as birth father precludes him
from paternal status as to the re'sulting twins. Thus, in this no-sex case,
Hendrix is left to suffer his regret about his actions, 322 whether for entering an
agreement with an untrustworthy woman or failing to memorialize his
expectations in writing.
316. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra note 159 (noting limited readings of Lawrence).
317. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
318. This section focuses on sperm donors, although contemporary practices of assisted
reproduction invite similar controversies involving ova donors. See, e.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005) (limiting the reach of the understanding of an ova "donor").
319. 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Hendrix v. Harrington, 555 U.S. 937
(2008).
320. See Man Fights for Parental Rights, KCTV5-KANSAS CITY, Nov. 23, 2007.
321. The Court denied certiorari. 555 U.S. 937 (2008).
322. Cf Sandi Varnado, Who 's Your Daddy?: A Legitimate Question Given Louisiana's Lack of
Legislation Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 66 LA. L. REv. 609, 617-18 (2006)
(surmising reasons for possible donor regret).
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The court requires respect for his implied precommitment or his
constructive choice, based on the statutory default rule. The majority interprets
the statute to advance state interests incompatible with legal recognition of
second thoughts: "predictability, clarity, and enforceability." 32 3 Explaining that
the statute afforded Hendrix an opportunity to bargain for parental rights before
providing his semen for Harrington's insemination, the majority asserts that
"the male's ability to insist on father status effectively disappears once he
donates sperm." 324 This reasoning recalls Dubay's responsibility model3 25 in
two important ways, even though the cases are mirror images. First, both
courts emphasize that the challengers should have acted sooner to secure their
objectives; their regret comes too late. Second, parentage is a legal
construction. Hendrix's genetic tie to the twins is irrelevant because the law
makes it so, given his failure to comply with the statutory requirements for
"opting in" to parental status. He represents not only a variation on the theme
of the thwarted father in adoption cases326 but also a litigant who, like Matthew
Dubay, challenges the way the state has chosen to define "father." 327 To the
extent that K.MH. makes the time of the sperm donation controlling, it also
contrasts with A.Z.,328 which allows for a change of mind even after the man
has relinquished the sperm. 329
In a complementary case to K.MH., Ferguson v. McKiernan,330 a divided
Pennsylvania Supreme Court enforced a pre-insemination agreement in which
Joel McKiernan promised to provide sperm for IVF for Yvonne Ferguson, his
former lover, so long as he would not be responsible for child support. Here,
after twins were born, it was their mother, Ferguson, who had second thoughts
and subsequently sought child support from McKiernan. The majority
acknowledges the interests of others-particularly the children. It concedes
that support obligations would certainly follow conception by sexual
intercourse (A la Dubay's responsibility model), but sees a "commonsense" 331
and "self-evident" 332 distinction between such sexual conduct and "the non-
323. 169 P.3d at 1039. For a thorough analysis of the case and underlying policy issues, see
Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How Written Agreement Statutes Are
Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parenting Issues in Assisted Reproduction Cases, 47 FAM. CT.
REV. 340 (2009).
324. 169 P.3d at 1039.
325. See supra notes 223-287 and accompanying text.
326. See, e.g., Oren, supra note 201, at 160-70 (describing cases in which the birth mother, seeking
to place a newborn for adoption, purposely thwarted the birth father's efforts to establish a relationship
with the child, a step necessary to establish his right to a pre-adoption notice and hearing).
327. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-50 (1972) (finding a violation of due process in the
state's exclusion of unmarried fathers from the statutory definition of "parents").
328. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
329. See supra notes 294-297 and accompanying text.
330. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
331. Id. at 1245. See Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994) (disallowing a man from
invoking the status of sperm donor, instead of father, when the insemination occurred by sexual
intercourse).
332. Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1246.
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sexual clinical options for conception that are increasingly common in the
modern reproductive environment." 333 The court fails to explain why except to
suggest that this resolution of the controversy enhances women's reproductive
options: a rule of unenforceability for such agreements "would mean that a
woman who wishes to have a baby but is unable to conceive through
intercourse could not seek sperm from a man she knows and admires, while
assuring him that he will never be subject to a support order and being herself
assured that he will never be able to seek custody of the child" 334-leaving her
no choice but to resort to anonymously donated semen.
With respect to anonymously donated semen deposited at sperm banks, the
prevailing approach has long excluded the donor from paternal status and
treated his identity as confidential, per agreement.335 Early legal responses to
donor insemination assumed as the paradigm a married heterosexual couple
with an infertile husband; indeed, the focus on the husband led some authorities
once to regard the process as adultery.336 Under the traditional presumption of
legitimacy, as well as principles of estoppel, the husband would be the legal
father of any resulting child and the donor would have no legal status.337 Little
thought apparently was given to the possibility of unmarried women using the
process, which has now become common practice. 338
Today, in the United States sperm banks provide various options for
selection in advance, including anonymity and "identity release." 339  Recent
reforms in the United Kingdom allow those conceived with donor gametes
(both sperm and ova) to obtain, when they turn 16, nonidentifying information
about their genetic parents and their donor-conceived siblings and, when they
333. Id. at 1245. For another illustration of this principle, see In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d
1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). See infra notes 488490 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
In rejecting the application of a strict intent test, however, to resolve a parentage dispute between
former lesbian partners, when one contributed ova and the other gestated the pregnancy, the California
Supreme Court has suggested the method of conception should not matter:
Usually, whether there is evidence of a parent and child relationship . . . does not
depend upon the intent of the parent. For example, a man who engages in sexual
intercourse with a woman who assures him, falsely, that she is incapable of conceiving
children is the father of a resulting child, despite his lack of intent to become a father.
K.M., 117 P.3d at 682. Accordingly, the court decided that the plan to raise the children in the parties'
joint home means that the woman who contributed the ova is not a mere donor without parental status.
Id.
334. 940 A.2d at 1247.
335. E.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001).
336. See Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 432-33; MAY, supra note 111, at 242-43.
337. Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973), 9B U.L.A. 377 (2001).
338. See Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, at 44
(detailing the experiences of several single women who used donor insemination to have children).
339. Reproductive Technologies, Inc., The Sperm Bank of California, http://thespermbankofca.org
(last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
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turn 18, identifying information.340  These reforms respect expectations and
agreements by taking effect according to a schedule designed to prevent
surprise to those who donated before the enactment of the new rules.341
The evolution of these practices and legal principles has conceptualized
donor insemination as a medical intervention 342 -even though the process is
sufficiently simple that do-it-yourself efforts are common, with turkey basters
long and widely cited for this purpose.343 The Kansas statute in KMH.m and
the opinion in Ferguson345 both emphasize the clinical or medical, and hence
asexual, aspect of the procedure. Further, given the different legal
consequences for men depending on the method of conception, the involvement
of a physician in donor insemination serves an evidentiary function, helping to
establish the process used in a given case. In the absence of such evidence, the
controversy about the method of conception and hence the legal status of the
genetic father might easily devolve into a "he said/she said" argument.346
The principles showcased in K.MH. and Ferguson make no room for
regret, even at the expense of the policy that prefers two parents for each child,
designed to ensure that children's needs will be met privately. In other words,
even though these cases resemble Dubay in their treatment of regret, one sees a
340. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 2008, ch. 22, § 24 (U.K.) (§ 31ZA, amending
§ 31 of the 1990 Act). Arguments against anonymity have started to mount in the U.S. See, e.g.,
Alessandra Rafferty, Donor-Conceived and Out of the Closet, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 2011, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/25/donor-conceived-and-out-of-the-closet.html; Colton Wooten, A
Father's Day Plea to Sperm Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at WK9.
341. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: Explanatory Notes 24 (explaining that
"[d]onor conceived people will be able to request identifying information about their donor from 2023
onwards, in relation to donors who donated identifiably from April 2005" or earlier for donors who re-
registered as identifiable), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2008/en/ukpgaen 20080022_en.pdf.
342. See MAY, supra note 111, at 242-43; Bernstein, supra note 219, at 1079 (citing the medical
profession as "a major mobilizing force behind the growing acceptance" of donor insemination); see
also Moon v. Michigan Reproductive & IVF Ctr., 2011 WL 4503310 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that fertility services constitute medical treatment that cannot be withheld, under state nondiscrimination
statute, from single women).
343. Renate Duelli Klein, Doing It Ourselves: Self Insemination, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT
FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? 382 (Rita Arditti, Renate Duelli Klein & Shelley Minden eds., 1984);
Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial
Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5 (1991).
344. 169 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Kan. 2007) (quoting the statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. 38-1114(f), which
requires "semen provided to a licensed physician").
345. 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) ("Indeed, the parties could have done little more than they did
to imbue the transaction with the hallmarks of institutional, non-sexual conception by sperm donation
and IVF.").
346. For examples of these arguments about the father's legal status, see Adams-Hall v. Adams, 3
A.3d 1096 (Del. 2010), and In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). See also
Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between the Men Involved
in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 984 (2009) (criticizing the
requirement of a licensed physician while explaining its evidentiary purpose). Although the 1973
version of the Uniform Parentage Act included the requirement of a physician, the drafters removed the
requirement in the 2000 version. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2002), 9B U.L.A. 62 (Supp. 2011)
("The new Act does not continue the requirement [in the 1973 version] that the donor provide the sperm
to a licensed physician.").
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sharp contrast on an axis of child support and privatized dependency.347 On this
axis, K.MH. and Ferguson, both no-sex cases, diverge sharply from Dubay, a
sex case demonstrating unwavering adherence to the responsibility model of
regret. These no-sex cases emphasize instead respect for choices (or
constructive choices) made at Time 1, whether memorialized in an agreement,
as in Ferguson, or imposed because of failure to depart from the default rule, as
in K.MH. This reliance on preconception intent accords with recommendations
of intent-based parentage for assisted reproduction that scholars have offered,
noting that assisted reproduction always constitutes a purposive and deliberate
choice, unlike much sexual procreation.34 8
True, we could see the glass as half empty instead of half full, especially
when reading these cases against Baby M49 and AZ. v. B.Z. ,'50 two no-sex
scenarios in which one participant's later regret carries the day. Moreover, in
Baby M, regret is deployed to allow one who had originally disclaimed parental
rights to reclaim them, precisely the effort that failed in KMH., while in AZ
regret operates to permit someone who had precommitted to genetic parenthood
(and provided sperm solely for that purpose) subsequently to reconsider that
that choice.
Gender may well have some explanatory value here. Although men prevail
in some of the no-sex cases (A.Z. and Ferguson) but women win in others
(Baby MandK.M.H.), together, these cases suggest that courts are more willing
to exclude men from parental status than women (given that sperm donors are
always men).351 Put differently, we might find in the no-sex cases that a man's
decision to waive parenthood typically receives recognition, whether expressed
at Time 2 (as in A.Z) or at Time 1 (as in K.MH. and Ferguson), but a women's
waiver is subject to second thoughts (as in Baby M). Although gestation might
explain the different treatment, the contrasting results in the sex cases suggest
that the "price of pleasure" provides an even more compelling rationale. In sex
cases, courts decline to permit a surrendering birth mother's requested
reconsideration of waiver of her parental rights (in the adoption cases), just as
they decline to respect an unintended father's effort to avoid parental status (in
Dubay).
347. See K.M.H., 169 P.3d at 1051 (Hill, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the
children's best interests); Ferguson, 940 A.2d at 1249 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
allowing the parents to bargain away the children's interests).
348. See also, e.g., Lewis, supra note 346, at 982-83; Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions
and Binding Biology: Seeking Aid in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 552-54 (1994).
349. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
350. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
351. The K.MH. court explicitly sees the statute as drawing a gender-based line between female
sperm recipients and male sperm donors, but decides that the governmental objectives of predictability,
clarity, and enforceability satisfy the requirements of equal protection. 169 P.3d at 1039. The California
Supreme Court's decision to recognize the would-be egg donor as a parent in K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673
(Cal. 2005), arguably supports the generalization. See supra note 333 and accompanying text
(summarizing this case).
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Despite these straightforward readings of the respect model of regret, I
would add one more perspective, emphasizing the potentially radical
ramifications of this approach. First, this model suspends many of the usual
principles of family law, including the requirement of two parents for each
child as a means of protecting the state from supporting needy children. 352
Similarly, this model takes pains to distance itself from the family law
exceptionalism so evident in A.Z's recitation of all the situations in which
family law permits reconsideration that would not be permitted elsewhere. 353
K.MH. and Ferguson simply treat the precommitments as binding, pursuant to
ordinary contract law, echoing an incipient trend in cases that enforce
prenuptial agreements. 354 In doing so, these courts seem less constrained by
gender norms355 than those in the other case studies, even if gender can never
be averted entirely. Finally, these courts seem to embrace the nontraditional
ways of forming families that the Baby M court resists. 356 Accordingly, the
respect model validates the observations made years ago by Judge Posner about
donor insemination, which he saw as "rich with social implications."3 57 This is
so because donor insemination "places lesbian custody beyond the reach of
governmental regulation," "allows women to escape having to share parenting
rights with men," and thereby "accelerates the shift in economic power from
men to women."358
Ill. REPRODUCING REGRET
With regret emerging from these case studies as malleable, slippery, and
chameleonic, one might feel tempted to ignore it as an empty placeholder
without distinctive meaning. Whether opportunistically or simply without
appreciation of the contrasting models that this Article has sought to
emphasize, courts have shaped regret to serve several different purposes:
reproach, redemption, resistance, responsibility, reconsideration, and respect.
Even if a shapeshifting placeholder, however, regret offers access to
352. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
353. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (quoting A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059). On family law
exceptionalism, see supra note 7.
354. E.g., In re Marriage of Pendleton & Fireman, 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000); Simeone v. Simeone,
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
355. In upholding prenuptial agreements, pursuant to the emerging trend, some courts expressly
reject the argument that gender-based inequalities in financial resources and bargaining power should
limit enforceability. E.g., Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
356. See Bernstein, supra note 219, at 1097-118 (tracing how artificial insemination, when used by
single women and in surrogacy arrangements, "rocked the boat," unsettling the legal and social
acceptance this medical practice had attained); Mary L. Shanley & Sujatha Jesudason, Surrogacy:
Reinscribing or Exploding the Nuclear Family? (APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, Aug. 1, 2011),
abstract available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1901304.




assumptions, values, and objectives at work when judges resolve controversies
about reproduction or family law more generally.
Gonzales is certainly not the only recent case in which the Supreme Court
has tackled a family law issue without full appreciation for histories and
nuances that those familiar with the field take for granted.359  Suppose the
Gonzales Court had considered reproduction and regret as a recurring problem
previously addressed in case law, instead of a newly discovered phenomenon.
Having a range of models before it, the Court might have decided that regret is
not a helpful analytical tool because of the indeterminacy of its implications,
shown by the array of judicial treatments. Alternatively, the Court might have
eschewed its own truncated and conclusory use of regret in favor of one of the
other models or some combination thereof-even though some of these are
flawed as well. It might have found that judicial disapproval of the underlying
conduct or choices often manifests itself in judicial approval of regret, which
then can function as a punishment or a deterrent. Thus, if Gonzales had
followed the path illustrated by the redemption model depicted in the adoption
surrenders6 o or Dubay's responsibility model,36' the opinion would have
embraced regret as well-deserved pain for disfavored decisionmaking, rather
than limiting options for the avowed purpose of preventing regret.
Alternatively, Gonzales's reproach model might have found a useful reference
in Baby M's resistance model, in which generalizations about women's
emotions were used to rationalize a rule of law restricting their reproductive
choices. 362 Indeed, Gonzales shifts power from the individual to the state in an
effort to halt behavior regarded as objectionable, mimicking Baby A's
approach without acknowledging this precedent.
Likewise, the Gonzales Court could have learned something from the
models illustrated by the no-sex cases, especially given the medical or clinical
359. For example, in Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), the Supreme Court's first
international family law case, the majority opinion interpreting and applying the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction shows no appreciation for the difficulties presented
by child custody cases concerning parental relocation and/or risks of domestic violence-familiar
problems in family law. See, e.g., Brief of the University of Cincinnati College of Law Domestic
Violence and Civil Protection Order Clinic as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Abbott v. Abbott,
130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010) (No. 08-645); Brief of Eleven Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Abbott v. Abbott (No. 8-645); Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon:
Choosing Between Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 J. FAM. L. 791 (1992-1993); Carol S. Bruch, The
Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention
Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529 (2004). Likewise, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005),
the majority reveals its limited understanding of domestic violence and the historical reluctance of law
enforcement to respond, although family law scholars and reformers have long called attention to such
problems. See, e.g., Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328 (David Kairys ed., 1998); Deborah M.
Weissman, The Personal Is Political-and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L.
REV. 387 (2007).
360. See supra notes 110-177 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 224-285 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 178-222 and accompanying text.
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settings that intact D & E abortion and ARTs share.363 True, the Gonzales
Court might well have found unhelpful in the abortion context the
reconsideration model used in A.Z.'s treatment of agreements fixing the
disposition of frozen embryos at a later time.364 In past cases, the Court has
emphasized both the immediacy of the abortion decision and the irrevocability
of that choice as well as the choice to carry to term.3ss Nonetheless, abortion
itself can be understood as reconsideration, based on knowledge that a woman
acquires about her present circumstances, including her health and that of the
fetus. The ability to terminate a pregnancy fits well within the freedom to
reconsider intimate relationships that A.Z so fiercely protects.366 Even beyond
this general connection, ARTs and abortion share more particularized links
because of the frequency with which IVF produces multi-fetal pregnancies that
prompt selective reduction367 and also because of the occasional change of
mind that leads a woman to terminate altogether an IVF-created pregnancy.
The respect model discernible in controversies arising from sperm donation
for alternative insemination 3 reflects the most contemporary thinking. The
cases demonstrating this model were decided just a few months after Gonzales,
reinforcing charges that the Supreme Court majority had turned back the clock
at the expense of more advanced and cogent reasoning.370 Like the redemption
and responsibility models, the respect model makes no attempt to alleviate
regret, but the reasons are utterly different. The respect model emphasizes
capacity and agency, it eschews paternalism, and it relies far less on gender
norms than the other models. 371 Indeed, we can find traces of the respect model
in Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Gonzales,372 which would honor autonomy and
individual decisionmaking even if regret sometimes follows. In this sense, the
respect model makes the most room for the productive relationship among
choice, regret, and personal growth described in the psychoanalytic
literature.37
363. For some of the political considerations that led to an abortion-rights strategy rooted in
medical and sexual privacy, instead of gender equality, see West, supra note 80, at 1423 (noting
controversy generated by the then pending Equal Rights Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
364. See supra notes 288-317 and accompanying text.
365. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
366. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (quoting A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059
(Mass. 2000)).
367. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon, Choosing One: Resolving the Epidemic of Multiples in Assisted
Reproduction, 55 VILL. L. REV. 147, 158 & n.62 (2010); Ruth Padawer, The Two-Minus-One
Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2011, at MM22.
368. See, e.g., Danielle Friedman, A New Debate Over In Vitro, THE DAILY BEAST, July 26, 2010,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/07/27/can-ivf-women-have-an-abortion.html (reporting,
inter alia, data from England's Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority that, on average, eighty
women per year terminate pregnancies achieved by IVF).
369. See supra notes 318-358 and accompanying text.
370. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
371. See supra notes 352-358 and accompanying text.
372. 550 U.S. at 169-91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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Beyond reorienting Gonzales, the regulatory moves apparent in the case
studies reveal several larger themes that merit more sustained analysis. First,
the courts' naturalization of regret belies the state's role not only in
constructing regret but also in spurring counter-constructions. Second, gender
serves as both an engine and a product of these constructions, which gain
strength from certain gender stereotypes and male norms of sexual interactions
and pleasures. Finally, regret helps to expose deep doctrinal and policy
inconsistencies that family law has failed to confront directly, including the
treatment of sex.
A. The State's Role: Before and After Regret
In all the cases and across all the models, courts myopically conceptualize
regret as a natural, internal, self-generated emotion, while ignoring any possible
contribution the state itself might make to this experience. Yet, the various
models illuminate the active production of regret through law. Put differently,
the various case studies reveal how law, though often nominally celebrating
reproductive and family autonomy, constrains choice, producing regret about
decisions made within such constraints. In addition, the models invite
examination of a dynamic process in which official constructions of regret set
in motion changes in life as well as in law.
1. Regret's Antecedents
The models in the sex cases (the reproach, redemption, and responsibility
models) demonstrate most compellingly how courts ignore the state's role in
creating and constructing regret. They all treat regret or the prospect of regret
as a product of the actor's own misguided decisions, whether choosing an
abortion or engaging in risky (i.e., potentially procreative) sex. Moreover,
courts then use regret to accomplish specific goals, such as redeeming wayward
birth mothers and deterring "irresponsible" reproduction. 374  Yet in each of
these scenarios, regret-always exquisitely contextual-arises not in a vacuum
but in response to the cultural setting, including governing legal rules.375
Indeed, the mainstream critique that state intervention to "cultivat[e], shap[e],
or script[] emotions" is too intrusive376 erroneously assumes the absence of law
from the ordinary course of affairs and process of affective response.
374. See supra notes 110-177, 224-285 and accompanying text.
375. See Abrams, supra note 68, at 592 ("[R]egret, like other emotions, emerges in a particular
social, political, and cultural context: we receive strong social and cultural cues about the emotions we
should feel and the objects that should provoke them."); see also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCL Q. 470 (1923) (exposing, in a classic
article, pervasive constraints on individual freedom derived from background laws, regardless of
professed principles).
376. Abrams and Keren note this critique. Abrams & Keren, supra note 5, at 2068-69.
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A closer look at the adoption-surrender case study, 377 the site of the
redemption model, illustrates this pattern. Adoption requirements and
procedures are products of state law,378 reinforced by cultural constructs such
as the challenges faced by many single parents and general sex negativity. 379 A
different legal approach, such as a preconsent counseling requirement,380 could
minimize regret, just as, more radically, a state with more generous social
insurance (in place of insistence on "personal responsibility") might obviate the
circumstances, such as economic hardship, that prompt some surrenders in the
first place.81 One could pursue a similar analysis of Dubay, the case of the
accidental father, in which the regret experienced also stems from this same
legal policy of "personal responsibility," implemented by means of an elaborate
administrative and judicial system that calculates child support and enforces
such obligations.
This dominant thinking crowds out alternative visions in which support of
children might constitute a state responsibility, as Martha Fineman and Anne
Alstott, among others, have proposed.382 In addition, the dominant thinking
subdues the full impact of the interconnections among these different laws.
Thus, as Dubay argued in court, law's protection of a woman's right to have an
abortion or carry to term vitiates his own reproductive autonomy. 383 Similarly,
but less openly acknowledged today, birth fathers' rights to veto adoptions
often work to vitiate the autonomy of birth mothers. 384
Likewise, if we look for the state's role in the abortion regret cited in
Gonzales, we find similar factors at work. First, legal requirements involving
genetic fathers in the process of surrendering an infant for adoption might well
377. See supra notes 109-177 and accompanying text.
378. See Lofton v. Sec. of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004)
(emphasizing that "adoption is wholly a creature of the state"), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005); see
also Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an asserted right to adopt).
379. On sex negativity, see, for example, Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 160, at 812-18.
380. See Samuels, supra note 173.
381. See, e.g., Wendy Koch, Struggling Families Look at Adoption, USA TODAY, May 19, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-05-18-mother N.htm.
382. See FINEMAN, supra note 8; Alston, supra note 266; Anne Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with
Equality? The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008); Nancy E.
Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007); Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage
at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909 (2006); see also West,
supra note 80, at 1409-10, 1425 (explaining how inadequate social welfare and abortion "choice" make
the decision to parent "a chosen consumer good or lifestyle").
True, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of public support in current neoliberal times, but
consider how even now we take for granted the state's (taxpayers') responsibility for children's
schooling. Of course, deficiencies in the quality of much public schooling today are well known.
383. See supra notes 230, 252 and accompanying text.
384. 1 am grateful to Professor Mary M. Beck, University of Missouri School of Law, for this
observation. See also, e.g., In re Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1233 n.1 I (Cal. 1992) (noting
that a mother's decision to thwart the birth father's efforts to assert parental rights should not imply
culpable motives on her part because "in most such cases the mother is acting out of deep concern for
her child's best interest").
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make abortion a more attractive alternative for some women. 385 Second, there
is the absence of ongoing financial support for women who would carry their
pregnancies to term if they could afford to rear a child.386 Empirical evidence
shows that a disproportionate number of abortion patients are women of color
and poor women, 387 and one cannot seriously suggest that such marginalized
members of the population are simply better able to exercise their
constitutionally protected right to reproductive autonomy than their white, more
economically comfortable counterparts. Corroborating evidence comes from
the rise in the abortion rate during the recent economic downturn in the U.S. 388
Indeed, some authorities have voiced concern that unrelenting insistence on
"personal responsibility" (i.e., child support) by poor fathers creates incentives
for men to encourage their sexual partners to have abortions. 389 Without going
so far as anti-abortion activists who claim that most abortions are coerced and
that no woman voluntarily chooses abortion, 390 certainly economic pressures-
sometimes expressed by men and often experienced by women-operate as a
factor in some abortion decisionmaking. Recent congressional efforts to defund
Planned Parenthood or to eliminate all of Title X's funding for family
planning,3 91 if enacted, would certainly exacerbate these problems.
In addition, we can assume state-imposed pre-abortion "informed consent"
litanies and ultrasound viewings evoke painful emotional reactions, just as they
are designed to do.392 This hypothesis is consistent with evidence that women
who experience the most intense negative feelings after abortion are those who
385. Email from Professor Mary M. Beck to author, Mar. 4, 2011, 3:22 p.m. CST (based on Beck's
experience representing birth mothers); see also Smith v. Malouf, 722 So. 2d 490, 502 (Miss. 1998)
(Smith, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns that the recognition of rights for birth fathers to participate
in decisions about whether an infant should be surrendered for adoption will encourage abortions
instead).
386. See, e.g., West, supra note 80, at 1409; Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, The G.O.P.'s Abandoned
Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011.
387. Three quarters of women who have abortions say they cannot afford a child. Thirty percent of
abortions occur to non-Hispanic black women, 36% to non-Hispanic white women, 25% to Hispanic
women and 9% to women of other races," and women below the poverty level have significantly higher
abortion rates than others. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN BRIEF, FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (May 2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb induced abortion.pdf.
For a historical examination, see Loretta J. Ross, African-American Women and Abortion, in THE
ABORTION WARS: A HALF CENTURY OF STRUGGLE, 1950-2000, at 161 (Rickie Solinger ed., 1998).
388. See, e.g., David Crary & Melanie S. Welte, Doctors See Economic Impact on Abortion, Birth
Control, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-03-24-family-
planningN.htm.
389. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200,219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
390. Thus, anti-abortion campaigns often claim that abortion must be restricted because most
women are forced to have the procedure. See, e.g., Stop Forced Abortion, FORCED ABORTIONS IN
AMERICA, http://www.stopforcedabortions.org/docs.forcedabortions.pdf.
391. See Eckholm, supra note 246; Steinhauer, supra note 68.
392. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 5, at 2055, 2063-64; Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and
Emotion, supra note 27. For a thoughtful analysis of the questions posed by pre-abortion ultrasound
requirements, see Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008).
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made their decision by deferring to others 393 and that in the long run omissions
(failures to act) produce greater regret than actions. 394 Such evidence suggests a
thorough examination of regret must include women who respond to such legal
requirements by forgoing abortion. Considering these women along with those
who choose abortion despite such requirements, it should come as no surprise
that rising concerns about abortion-related regret coincide with the advent of
such laws, some of which now compel reciting to the patient that her abortion
"will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being" with
whom the woman shares an existing and constitutionally protected
relationship.395 Such laws both reflect and shape social forces that become part
of the background for the emotional experience, with abortion decisions having
"unusual cultural salience," as observers have pointed out.396
The problems persist even if we focus only on the late-term abortion
procedure (intact D & E) targeted by the legislation upheld in Gonzales. The
procedure in question typically had been used by two quite different groups of
women, women with advanced, wanted pregnancies who discovered a
devastating fetal anomaly and young, poor women who did not know they were
pregnant earlier or encountered economic or structural problems (perhaps a
parental involvement requirement397) preventing a timely abortion.398 The
statutory prohibition upheld by the Court does nothing to ease the emotional
pain felt by the former (in fact, it aggravates it399) and does nothing to alleviate
the difficulties experienced by the latter. In sum, Gonzales's promise that law
can rescue the vulnerable among us from feelings of regret fails to
acknowledge the role of both law and culture in creating reasons why we
experience such feelings in the first place, just as it fails to acknowledge how
the abortion options that remain often present greater risks and trauma than the
procedure proscribed.
These insights make especially meaningful and provocative several recent
empirical investigations. These include an extensive study, published in 2011,
of over 84,000 Danish women and girls who had first-time first-trimester
393. See Matthew T. Crawford et al., Reactance, Compliance, and Anticipated Regret, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 56, 60 (2002) (finding that compliant behavior results in greater
retrospective regret); Patterson, supra note 68, at 687-88 (finding the most negative experiences of
abortion regret in cases in which women followed the desires of others rather than choosing abortion
themselves); supra note 68 (citing other studies).
394. See Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Hosted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and
Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REv. 379 (1995).
395. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (2005); Planned
Parenthood v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
396. Abrams, supra note 68, at 592.
397. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992)
(joint opinion).
398. See, e.g., Rigel C. Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle Over Late-Term
Abortion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397 (1998).
399. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:2318
Reproduction and Regret
abortions, whom the investigators compared with those who gave birth. 400 The
researchers found that the processes of carrying to term and giving birth have a
closer association with seeking psychiatric treatment than did having an
abortion. These findings coincide with recent guidelines published in the
United Kingdom by the Royal Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists,
under which women should be advised that abortion is generally safer than
carrying to term and that most women do not experience adverse psychological
effects from abortion.401 The Danish data also largely corroborate U.S.
researchers' 2009 conclusions, using materials from the American
Psychological Association's Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion, which
determined that most adult women who have abortions experience no mental
402health problems, although some do. To the extent that seeking psychiatric
treatment and having mental health problems serve as proxies for regret or the
so-called post-abortion syndrome posited in Sandra Cano's brief,403 the Danish
data and the other studies challenge Gonzales's premises. However, they also
leave room for the possibility that the legal and societal hurdles to abortion in
the U.S. make a study of Danish women or British guidelines not fully
applicable here, reinforcing the significance of legal and cultural constructions
of regret. Ongoing empirical research, probably sparked at least in part by
Gonzales, is exploring such questions by investigating how women experience
abortion given the attitudes they encounter in their communities, the media,
and the public discourse.404
2. Regret's Progeny
Just as culture, law, and government policies construct and shape regret,
however, experiences of regret have sparked new practices and legal
approaches. First, in place of the "choicelessness 405 that many surrendering
birth mothers in Fessler's book reported experiencing,406 the decreased stigma
of unmarried motherhood opens possibilities for unmarried parents to rear their
children. t The excruciating pain that surrendering birth mothers have
400. Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. 332 (2011).
401. See UK New RCOG Guidance Highlights Advances in Abortion Care, ABORTION REV., Jan.
26, 2011, available at http://www.abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/909/.
402. Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the Evidence, 64 AM. PSYCHOL.
863 (2009).
403. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
404. See Social and Emotional Aspects of Abortion, ANSIRH (Advancing New Standards in
Reproductive Health), University of California at San Francisco,
http://www.ansirh.org/research/aspects.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
405. See supra note I14 and accompanying text (quoting Rickie Solinger on "choicelessness").
406. See supra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
407. Recall that the earlier pressure to surrender focused on the birth mothers of white babies, given
the "demand" among prospective adopters for such children. See supra note Ill and accompanying text.
Census data show that today almost ten percent of white children live with unmarried parents or never-
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reportedly experienced has prompted adoption reforms, although recent cases
like D.N. T 408 show that more work remains before the demise of the
redemption model. In place of the closed adoptions and secrecy that prevailed
before Roe,409 open or cooperative adoption, in which birth parents maintain
some communication with the child and the adoptive family, has become
commonplace today.410  Authorities attribute the rise of this approach411 to
several factors, including the increasing number of older children (with
established ties to their biological families) placed for adoption; the change in
the adoption "market" following Roe's legalization of abortion and the
resulting ability of birth parents to demand enhanced placement conditions; and
the growing sensitivity of experts to the damaging effects of secrecy on
adoptees, birth parents, and adopters.412 Although open adoption has generated
its own controversies 413 and D.N. T illustrates possible pitfalls of open
relationships between birth and adoptive families,414 evidence indicates that
open adoption has decreased some of the negative emotions that birth parents
once felt in closed adoptions. The rise of the relatively new practice of open
adoption offers additional choices to birth parents, softening the "all or
nothing" decision they once faced.415 Thus, law reform can play a salutary
role-but removing an option, as Gonzales does, seems far less likely to
416prevent a painful look back than to produce one.
Baby M,417 a no-sex case,418 also launches a story about legal change,
showing both the development of the resistance model of regret and its ultimate
failure in achieving its goals. Instead of preserving the legal status quo, Baby
M inspired new arrangements designed to circumvent its restrictions both
technologically and geographically. The development of IVF now permits
married mothers. America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table C3,
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2011).
408. In re Adoption of D.N.T., 843 So. 2d 690 (Miss. 2003).
409. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
410. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned Cooperative Adoption:
Can It Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30 FAM. L.Q. 483 (1996); Reuben Pannor & Annette Baran,
Open Adoption as Standard Practice, 63 CHILD WELFARE 245 (1984).
411. Open adoption was introduced in the literature in 1976 in an article noting a tradition of open
adoption in Hawaiian culture. Annette Baran et al., Open Adoption, 21 SoC. WORK 97 (1976).
412. JULIE BEREBITSKY, LIKE OUR VERY OWN: ADOPTION AND THE CHANGING CULTURE OF
MOTHERHOOD, 1851-1950, at 173-76 (2000). Both birth mothers and adoptees have played significant
roles in the rise of open adoption. See SHANLEY, supra note 137, at 21; Sanger, supra note 114, at 489-
91.
413. See, e.g., Groves v. Clark, 982 P.2d 446 (Mont. 1999).
414. Recall that Camille and Diane moved into the home of Carol and Rick, who were hoping to
adopt a baby. See supra notes 128-133 and accompanying text.
415. See FESSLER, supra note 12, at 189. Fessler goes on to note, however, how the situation of
surrendering birth mothers has worsened in recent years, with several states now offering shorter time
periods for post-birth consent and others making consent irrevocable. Id.
416. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
417. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
418. See supra notes 314-317 (finding a sex/no-sex distinction in the cases).
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collaborations that have eclipsed the traditional surrogacy arrangement used in
Baby M, in which the surrogate provides both genes and gestation. Some
women facing fertility challenges now use donor ova.419 Alternatively,
gestational surrogacy arrangements use ova from the intended mother (i.e., the
woman who intends to rear the child as her own)420 or from a third-party
donor, 42 but not from the woman who will gestate the pregnancy.
Although more costly than traditional surrogacy, gestational surrogacy has
evoked a more supportive legal response for intended parents than traditional
surrogacy in some jurisdictions, in part because the usual criteria for identifying
"the mother" do not easily apply in such cases, given the split between genetic
and gestational functions, in turn altering the legal consequences if a surrogate
422
changes her mind. As a result, infertility clinics now routinely use gestational
surrogacy.423 True, not all courts observe legal distinctions between traditional
424
and gestational surrogacy, as recent controversies in New Jersey illustrate.
Still, some courts have helped gestational surrogacy realize its potential to
transform long-held understandings of family-even ruling that, when a man is
the sole intended parent, such arrangements may produce a child with only a
father, but no legal mother. Others have generously interpreted choice-of-law
analysis to make restrictions like those in Baby M easy to evade.426 Today,
reproductive tourism takes many Americans across the globe to engage
"gestational carriers" for lower rates and with fewer legal hassles than they
would find at home.427 Despite Baby M's resistance, then, the use of assisted
419. Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 15, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/ 5egg-t.html.
420. E.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
421. E.g., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
422. See Johnson, 851 P.2d 776; see also, e.g., Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011)
(upholding a gestational surrogacy agreement and recognizing the intended father and his partner as
parents, without requiring adoption); In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (recognizing the
intended father as the only legal parent at the birth of a child born pursuant to a gestational surrogacy
agreement).
423. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 2011) (prefatory
cmt. to Art. 8); see also ABA, MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY,
Article 7, Feb. 2008 (offering a similar model), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf
424. For example, courts in New Jersey, where Baby M supplies the controlling principles, have
recognized the surrogate as the mother of twins even though the ova came from a donor. In re Parentage
of a Child, 16 A.3d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011); see DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 183;
Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at Al; see also
A.G.R. v. D.R.H, No. FD-09-001838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2009), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231 _SURROGATE.pdf.
425. E.g., Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115; see Raftapol, 12 A.3d 783 (recognizing two men as parents
upon birth, without adoption).
426. E.g., Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004).
427. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006); Audi & Chang, supra note 197; MADE IN INDIA, supra
note 197. Reproductive tourism has attracted intended parents from foreign countries to the United
States and other countries. See, e.g., France: Surrogacy Ban Affirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2011, at A7
(reporting a French judicial opinion refusing to grant French citizenship to twins born to a surrogate in
the United States for French intended parents).
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reproduction has flourished largely without significant legal regulation. Baby
M's treatment of regret has played an important part in directing this trajectory.
3. Reshaping Regret
Acknowledging the role of law in inciting regret raises normative questions
about what stance the state should take. Of all the models, the respect model
most successfully escapes the critiques and observations evoked by the others.
Although Ferguson v. McKiernan428 cites specific policy reasons for enforcing
agreements regarding a sperm donor's status (enhancing women's options in
selecting donors 429), K.MH 4 30 signals a different approach. The court seems
less wedded to a particular default rule than to the value of having some default
rule.431 The K.MH. court defers to the legislature's choice and the availability
of private ordering for those who prefer an alternative arrangement. The court
embraces autonomy while conveying that it appreciates how law shapes
individual choices. The court does not allow allegations of ignorance of the law
or of future feelings to trump previous decisions and actions.432 The court's
objective is practical, not ideological or punitive.
Significantly, the KM.H. court's general approach would have remained
applicable had the legislature chosen a different default rule that would have
recognized the donor as the father as long as he did not opt out. Nonetheless,
the particular default chosen, requiring those seeking to be fathers to opt in,
challenges the familiar construction of fatherhood as natural and its financial
obligations as inextricable. This approach invites us to reimagine motherhood
too-a process that has been unfolding since Baby Min 1988, as various legal
authorities have sought to develop principles to govern surrogacy
arrangements.433 Conceptualizing motherhood so that it would require opting
in434 would fundamentally change the assumptions underlying the Gonzales
majority's understanding of abortion. A seed from which this understanding
might have developed appears in the Supreme Court's early reproductive rights
jurisprudence, specifically the articulation of a "decision whether to bear or
428. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
429. See supra notes 330-334 and accompanying text.
430. 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 937 (2008).
431. Id. at 103944; see supra note 323 and accompanying text.
432. Id. at 1044.
433. E.g., Raftopol, 12 A.3d 783; Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115; Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging
Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law, 23 VT. L. REV. 225 (1998).
434. In fact, a feminist (self-help) trade book uses this idea in its title. AMY RICHARDS, OPTING IN:
HAVING A CHILD WITHOUT LOSING YOURSELF (2008). Scholarly literature has recently explored the
concept of "choice architecture." See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). This term refers to the way that choices
are framed and the impact of framing on individual decisions-for example, default rules that allow
opting in versus those that allow opting out in light of a perceived socially desirable goal. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 761 (2007).
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beget a child" in granting constitutional protection for access to contraception
in Eisenstadt v. Baird.435 The Gonzales majority opinion includes no trace of
this once important rhetoric. 436
Under the respect model, the legal significance of regret does not
evaporate, but leaves the individual to decide what weight to accord to the
possibility of subsequent second or later thoughts, within the constraints of
applicable default and background rules.437 This approach makes room for the
psychoanalytic vision of choice and regret as ingredients in personal growth.438
With its simplistic statement about regret,439 the Gonzales majority missed an
opportunity to explore this more complex relationship among autonomy, regret,
and legal regulation.
B. Engendering Regret
Although the respect model stands out as a possible exception,440 regret
performs gendered work in all the case studies. Many of the initial critiques of
Gonzales emphasize this aspect of the case,"' which finds considerable support
in the other models of regret as well. Placing Gonzales's model of regret in
dialogue with alternative approaches reveals new facets of the underlying
assumptions about women, men, and sexualities.
1. Regret and Gender Scripts
Taken together, we might discern in the different models of regret a
continuum of maternal self-sacrifice. When faced with an unwanted pregnancy,
a woman should give birth and surrender the child for adoption, no matter the
regret and emotional pain she might suffer as a result; she will be rewarded
with redemption. If she cannot live up to this ideal, then we would expect a
self-sacrificing mother to keep and rear the child despite the impact on the
435. 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
436. Although the Gonzales majority omits all reference to Eisenstadt, Justice Ginsburg does cite
Eisenstadt in her dissent. 550 U.S. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
437. See Abrams, supra note 68, at 586:
[A] focus on regret seems ill-suited to a liberal democracy, which venerates the
ostensibly unencumbered choices of its citizens. If citizens have been afforded the
opportunity to make their choices, their second thoughts-a reflection of their broader
responsibility for those choices-are their own business, not matters of public concern.
438. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text. For a recent example from popular culture, see
Kassi Underwood, A Lost Child But Not Mine, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at ST6 (reflecting on a past
abortion in the "Modern Love" column).
439. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
440. See supra notes 349-358 and accompanying text.
441. E.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183-84 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Manian,
supra note 27.
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woman's own life and future. In both cases, the woman puts the would-be
interests of the child ahead of her own. A woman who chooses abortion (just
like a woman who enters into a surrogacy contract442 ) falls at the wrong end of
the continuum, showing insufficient concern for her child-to-be.
This construction overlooks a primary reason that women have turned to
the particular abortion procedure banned by the law upheld in Gonzales. Intact
D & E has often been used by women who learn about a devastating fetal
anomaly during an advanced and wanted pregnancy.443 For these women,
ending the pregnancy represents a choice steeped in love and self-sacrifice,
with intact D & E giving them the opportunity to hold the lifeless body after
delivery and to mourn the loss. 4" The pain of regret constitutes the self-
sacrifice that these women have chosen to endure, as they see it, in the interests
of the might-have-been child and often other children in the family, too." 5
Most scholarly responses to Gonzales's regret rationale condemn the
Court's paternalistic depiction of women who choose abortion.446 Jody Madeira
offers a richer understanding of the depiction of women as reproductive
decisionmakers by contrasting the Gonzales critiques and their opposition to
increased regulation of abortion with the scholarship on IVF and other
ARTs." According to Madeira, the IVF scholarship portrays fertility-
challenged women as desperate consumers of every imaginable medical
intervention, constructing them as irrational and overly emotional
decisionmakers oblivious to health risks and bent on motherhood at all costs-
and hence in need of increased legal regulation." 8
Both Madeira's and the Gonzales critics' accounts are instructive but
incomplete. In setting their sights on the problematic construction of women as
reproductive decisionmakers, they leave unexplored the construction of men as
442. See Sanger, supra note 114, at 450-64.
443. See supra notes 49, 398 and accompanying text.
444. Some of the briefs filed in Gonzales document these attitudes and this practice. Brief of Amici
Curiae American Medical Women's Association, American Public Health Association, et al. in Support
of Respondents at 15 n.10, Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382); Brief of the Institute
for Reproductive Health Access and Fifty-Two Clinics and Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 6-13, 22-24, Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 05-1382).
445. For a more general argument about how motherhood informs women's abortion decisions, see
Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life. How Abortion Serves Women's Interests in Motherhood, 17
J.L. & POL'Y 97 (2008).
446. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
447. Jody L. Madeira, Woman Scorned?. Resurrecting Infertile Women's Decision-Making
Autonomy, 70 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
448. Regulation might take the form of ARTs restrictions, such as a limitation on the number of
embryos that may be transferred at any one time, as imposed in a number of foreign countries. See, e.g.,
Velikonja, supra note 288, at 494-95. Alternatively, regulation might take the form of pro-ARTs
measures, such as insurance coverage mandates for IVF (which might discourage high risk moves, such
as the creation of multifetal pregnancies, in an effort to beat the odds without breaking one's personal
bank). Compare, e.g., id. at 489, with I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should It Matter?, 95
MINN. L. REV. 485 (2010).
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reproductive decisionmakers-the implied but essential antithesis that shapes
the stereotype. Indeed, the two constructions are mutually constitutive.449
While the personal-responsibility cases (illustrated by Dubay) put the
fatherhood-averse male in the limelight,45 0 leaving the maternal figure in the
background, 451 disputes about frozen embryos created from IVF (as in AZ. and
Evans)452 expressly present these males and females as fully developed
subjects, in direct opposition to one another, pursuing incompatible
reproductive agendas that typify their very different roles in society. According
to this gendered understanding, men seek to avoid parenthood and all attendant
responsibilities, both emotional and material, while women harbor such a
powerful desire to mother that they are willing to take these men to court if
necessary to achieve that goal.453 Read in this light, the reproach in Gonzales,
then, reflects the majority's disapproval of deviation from the script.454
2. Re-examining the "Price ofPleasure"
The construction of gender extends beyond the stereotypes of women and
men in the case studies and conveys assumptions about sexual experience,
sexual performance, and sex itself. In the sex cases (as distinguished from the
no-sex cases), regret often functions as a legally sanctioned "price of pleasure,"
as illustrated by both the adoption-surrender cases' redemption model and
Dubay's responsibility model. Here, regret's regulatory function takes a
punitive turn. Despite the stereotypes and even double standards that run
through the case studies, there is surprisingly little attention paid to commonly
understood but legally undertheorized differences in female and male
sexualities, behaviors, anatomies, and pleasures. Put differently, in making
regret the currency with which both men and women pay for engaging in
heterosexual sex, courts take a gender-blind approach and thus assume a male
455
norm.
449. See generally, e.g., NANCY DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND
PRIVILEGE (2010) (explaining why the examination of manhood and masculinities is important to
feminist legal theory).
450. See supra notes 262-285 and accompanying text.
451. Although the litigation is styled Wells v. Dubay, 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007), the case against
Dubay was prosecuted by the attorneys for the county and state, which would have had to provide
support for the child if Dubay could not be made to do so.
452. See supra notes 288-315 and accompanying text.
453. This stereotype is reinforced by what Madeira calls "stock narratives" of infertile women.
Madeira, supra note 447. Of course, one can find exceptions to the stereotype. For example, in J.B. v.
M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001), the man sought to use the frozen preembryos that he had helped create,
over the objection of his former wife, who had contributed the ova. The court ruled in her favor.
454. Disapproval of such departures from familiar gender scripts also help explain judicial
reluctance to conclude that a child may be born with no legal mother. See Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 132-
37 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
455. Judith Butler writes:
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Justice Ginsburg's Gonzales dissent recognizes that some pregnancies and
resulting abortion decisions originate in sexual assaults (of women by men).
This insight invites a deeper analysis of the interactions, apart from assaults,
that precipitate the reproductive consequences in the sex cases. For example,
recent data show that women in abusive relationships often find that their
partners have sabotaged their birth-control efforts456 (perhaps rough justice,
given the birth control fraud that some women reportedly practice, according to
allegations in cases like Dubay4 5 7). But even beyond cases of assault and birth-
control sabotage, the legal notion of consensual sex simplifies what is often a
much more complicated give-and-take that plays out against a field marked by
power imbalances, nonreciprocal dependencies, and affections, including
sometimes love.458 Although Catharine MacKinnon would see all heterosexual
intercourse as a reflection of women's subordination, 459 even legal feminists
skeptical of this conclusion understand consent to sexual intercourse as
something other than a switch that can be only "on" or "off." Of course,
Jeannie Suk's controversial examination of Gonzales, connecting concerns
about consent to sex with concerns about consent to abortion, reminds us of
both the success and the hazard of such skepticism and nuance.460
Add to these considerations a very brief summary of some of what we have
learned from modem sexuality experts: Most (heterosexual) men agree that
penetration forms the center of their sexuality.461 Women, by contrast, report
that sensuality, intimacy, closeness, and orgasm are not as successfully
462
achieved by penile-vaginal penetration as by other forms of expression.
True, cultural and social forces go a long way toward accounting for these
If sexuality is conceived as liberated from gender, then the sexuality that is "liberated"
from feminism will be one which suspends the reference to masculine and feminine,
reinforcing the refusal to mark that difference, which is the conventional way in which
the masculine has achieved the status of the "sex" which is one.
Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1, 23 (Elizabeth Weed &
Naomi Schor, eds. 1997).
456. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Report Details Sabotage of Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2011,
at D6.
457. 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007); see also supra note 283-285 and accompanying text (citing
"purloined sperm" cases). For another twist that brings yet additional challenges to our gender
stereotypes, see Conor Berry, Insemination Fight Ends in Wife's Arrest, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Mar. 9,
2009 (reporting charges of assault and battery against a Massachusetts woman who attempted to
inseminate forcibly her wife with her brother's sperm), available at 2009 WLNR 5177257.
458. See, e.g., West, Sex, Law and Consent, supra note 90. For contemporary analyses of love, see,
for example, LISA APPIGNANESI, ALL ABOUT LOVE: ANATOMY OF AN UNRULY EMOTION (2011); Clare
Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2008).
459. See MacKinnon, supra note 89.
460. See supra note 91.
461. See, e.g., Alan Riley, The Role of the Partner in Erectile Dysfunction and Its Treatment, 14
INT'L J. IMPOTENCE RES. S105 (2002).
462. See, e.g., Annie Potts et al., The Downside of Viagra: Women's Experiences and Concerns, 25




contrasting preferences, and women's preferences may reflect adaptations
based on apparently limited options.464 In addition, however, the laboratory
studies conducted by William Masters and Virginia Johnson in the 1960s and
1970s revealed that all women's orgasms are clitorally, not vaginally,
triggered,465 thus explaining persistent reports not only of the "orgasm gap" that
women experience from conventional intercourse, when compared to men, but
466
also the practice of "faking" orgasm by some women. Further, an emerging
literature on "sexual fluidity" shows that women are more likely than their male
counterparts to develop satisfying relationships over time with men and with
women, defying the familiar identity categories of "straight" versus "gay." 467
Even if one regards such information as tentative and less than definitively
established, it certainly casts doubt on an across-the-board "price of pleasure"
basis for regret applicable to women and men alike, as under the redemption
and responsibility models. When Shari Motro uses this phrase, "the price of
pleasure," she has men in mind, and she seeks to provide a rationale for law to
recognize their additional responsibilities for pregnancies that they help cause,
beyond child support obligations.468 The rationale does not hold up well for
women, however, despite the similar tone and rhetoric in the adoption cases'
redemption model. While men in cases like Dubay most likely have
experienced the pleasure that the courts assume, the punitive stance in the
adoption cases seems too simplistic, especially when one examines the
469
narratives of those young women who surrendered babies in Fessler's book.
There one finds negligible evidence of pleasure, but instead pain,
misunderstanding, confusion, and fear. These women might well have met the
legal standard for consent (although some, given their age, probably failed to
do so under statutory rape laws). Indeed, they might have had all sorts of
reasons that prompted them to consent to the sexual activities that left them
pregnant-such as a desire for affection or popularity or as a way to signal
interest or commitment or the wish to please a sexual partner. Consensual sex
often reflects a bargain, trade, or perhaps an expression of gratitude, rather than
463. E.g., Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 160, at 840, 852.
464. Elizabeth Emens has coined the term "adaptive desires" for this phenomenon. See Appleton,
supra note 90, at 300-01 (citing unpublished work by Emens). On the concept of adaptive preferences,
see JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983).
465. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE 45-67, 135
(1966); see SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY ON FEMALE SEXUALITY 221 (1976)
(emphasizing the importance of clitoral stimulation for female sexual pleasure).
466. On the gendered "orgasm gap," see, for example, DOUGLASS & DOUGLASS, supra note 90, at
1-38 (2002); ELISABETH A. LLOYD, THE CASE OF THE FEMALE ORGASM: BIAS IN THE SCIENCE OF
EVOLUTION 21-43 (2005); and Susan E. Stiritz, Cultural Cliteracy: Exposing the Contexts of Women's
Not Coming, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 242 (2008).
467. See LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S LOVE AND DESIRE
224-28 (2008); see also RITCH C. SAVIN-WILLIAMS, THE NEW GAY TEENAGER: ADOLESCENT LIVES
194-223 (2005) (exploring teens' resistance to labels based on sexual identity).
468. Motro, supra note 282.
469. See supra notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
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a failure to resist temptation or keep passion in check.470  Indeed, sexuality
literature uses the term "sex against desire" for this phenomenon, 471 and legal
feminist Robin West has theorized about situations she describes as consensual
but unwelcome sex.472
Contemporary examinations of "hooking up" also prove instructive,
especially given the age at the time of pregnancy and surrender of many of the
women featured in Fessler's book. Studies of sexual practices on today's
college campuses have found that females and males participate in "hook ups"
in equal numbers but males report orgasm and sexual pleasure while females
report little enjoyment.473  Although some critics have looked askance at
hooking up because it detaches sex from intimacy, 474 the gendered "pleasure
gap" reflected by the data signals a different basis for concern. Even if hooking
up entails sex "just for fun," young women apparently are not having nearly as
much "fun" as their male counterparts.
With respect to sexual intercourse, the woman's consent tells us very little
about whether, for herself, she would have preferred a different type of
encounter without the risk of pregnancy and whether she had an orgasm or
otherwise found the experience enjoyable. In other words, consent provides an
inadequate basis for using regret to exact a price of pleasure on the path to
redemption, although it might provide other useful information about the
construction of sexuality in contemporary society.
Of course, the state might well seek to regulate sexual conduct in the
absence of pleasure, given the possibility of reproductive consequences, as the
adoption surrender cases suggest. Yet such reasoning unravels when we
consider how courts have responded to regret in cases about technologically
assisted reproduction, especially under the respect model.475  This model
indicates that policies purportedly designed to protect children (as well as to
privatize their support by ensuring two parents) apply only in sex cases, but not
in no-sex cases, in turn making parentage mandatory in sex cases but optional
in no-sex cases, an inconsistency that provides the focus of the next part of the
analysis.
470. See West, supra note 80, at 1429.
471. See DOUGLASS & DOUGLASS, supra note 90, at 148.
472. West, Sex, Law and Consent, supra note 90; see supra note 90 and accompanying text; see
also Chamallas, supra note 163, at 814-15 (preferring standard of "mutuality," given complications in
the concept of women's consent to sex).
473. See Paula England et al., Hooking Up and Forming Relationships on Today's College
Campuses, in THE GENDERED SOCIETY READER 531 (Michael S. Kimmel & Amy Aronson eds., 3d ed.
2008); Shelly Ronen, Grinding on the Dance Floor: Gendered Scripts and Sexualized Dancing at
College Parties, 24 GENDER & Soc. 355 (2010); see also Lisa Belkin, After Class, Skimpy Equality,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 28, 2011, at STI (examining the sexualization of women on college campuses
and women's apparent acceptance of this culture).
474. E.g., LAURA SESSIONS STEPP, UNHOOKED: How YOUNG WOMEN PURSUE SEX, DELAY LOVE
AND LOSE AT BOTH (2007) (criticizing hooking up as emotionally harmful to young women); see id. at
143 (blaming feminism for this harmful phenomenon).
475. See supra notes 319-358 and accompanying text.
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C. Family Law Fault Lines: Dependency, Autonomy, and Sex
Regret has functioned as a lightning rod in family law, distracting attention
from and thus camouflaging several different doctrinal and policy
inconsistencies. For example, family law today expressly embraces gender
neutrality (except for the requirement of one man and one woman to enter
marriage in most states),476 but the courts' deployment of regret reproduces
familiar gender stereotypes and norms. Similarly, Lawrence v. Texas,477
reaching beyond Eisenstadt v. Baird 78 before it, claims not just to liberate sex
from the traditional confines of procreation and heterosexual marriage, but
even to celebrate it; nonetheless, the models imposing a "price of pleasure"
perpetuate the notion that sex merits punishment, even if the penalty is not one
imposed by criminal law.
The persistence of family law's interest in regulating sex and sexualities
becomes even more visible by juxtaposing Dubay's responsibility model and
K.M.H.'s respect model. Exposing perhaps family law's most unstable fault
line or contact zone,479 these cases stand out as mirror images about genetic
fatherhood, with the responsibility model imposing parentage on an unwilling
man and the respect model refusing to recognize one who is willing. In neither
case is there a competing candidate (such as the mother's husband or partner)
for the role of second parent. 480  Judicial support for an intent-based test for
parentage in cases of assisted reproduction typically comes with a note of
caution that this approach does not extend to unintended conceptions from
sexual intercourse-without a satisfying explanation for the distinction.481
476. See, e.g., Case, supra note 21.
477. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (according constitutional protection for access to contraception by
unmarried individuals on equal terms with their married counterparts).
479. See Mary Louise Pratt, Arts of the Contact Zone, in NEGOTIATING ACADEMIC LITERACIES 171
(Vivian Zamel & Ruth Spack eds., 1998).
480. Cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. I10 (1989).
481. E.g., K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 687 (Cal. 2005) (Werdegar, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one, to my
knowledge, proposes to apply the intent test to determine the parentage of children conceived through
ordinary sexual reproduction."); cf In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 135 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J.,
dissenting) ("If a genetic mother and a birth mother [in a gestational surrogacy arrangement] can deny
maternity because neither intended to be mothers, men, who at the time of intercourse in many instances
do not intend to be fathers either, can certainly present an argument that they are being discriminated
against. If genetic and birth mothers can deny all maternity, why cannot genetic fathers and fathers
present at birth deny all paternity[?]"). In response to the different legal consequences for each method
of conception, some scholars have urged that some sexually conceiving genetic fathers should not bear
child support responsibilities to the same extent as other fathers. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker,
Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No
Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012) (on file with author); Melanie B.
Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood's Influence: Re-thinking Procreative Autonomy and Federal Paternity
Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POLY & L. (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author);
Higdon, supra note 284 (proposing an exception to child support obligations for fathers who did not
consent to the sexual act resulting in conception). Such analysis, however, minimizes the state interest
in regulating sex, as emphasized infra notes 495-499.
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Although both models make regret legally irrelevant, each one crystallizes
a different policy or theory claimed to infuse contemporary family law.
Dubay's responsibility model exemplifies how family law privatizes
dependency. Although this policy was once associated just with family law's
482
aim to channel sex into marriage4, it spread beyond marriage after the
Supreme Court deemed "illogical and unjust" many distinctions between
children born outside versus inside marriage, holding-in the name of
equality-that children of unmarried parents have the same right to support
483from two parents as their marital counterparts. The current vigor with which
child support obligations are imposed on and enforced against fathers,
regardless of marriage, has reinforced the claims of scholars who identify the
privatization of dependency as an organizing principle that runs throughout
family law today.48
If, in conscripting men like Dubay into fatherhood, the responsibility
model of regret demonstrates one ascendant theory of family law, the respect
model brings another to the fore. K.M.H. and Ferguson illustrate a theory of
family law that emphasizes privacy, autonomy, and self-determination, with
reproductive decisionmaking serving as a central pillar. Some of the Supreme
Court's own rhetoric reflects this theory,485 and it gains strength from reasoning
like that in Ferguson, which justifies its result by taking for granted a policy
486favoring expanded reproductive options for women.
Both of these efforts to theorize family law have shortcomings. The
responsibility model and the privatization of dependency cannot account for the
respect model and the one-parent families that it permits, protects, and
sometimes even requires. The respect model cannot account for the limits on
family and reproductive autonomy reflected in the responsibility model and its
case law, not to mention the constraints imposed by Gonzales's reproach
482. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the
Channeling Function ofFamily Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133; Schneider, supra note 8.
483. E.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (ruling that equal protection requires extending
the statute of limitations for proving paternity); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (ruling that
denying children born outside marriage support from their fathers violates equal protection); Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (holding that excluding children of unmarried
fathers from worker's compensation death benefits violates equal protection).
484. E.g., FINEMAN, supra note 8, at 228 ("It is the family, not the state or the market, that assumes
responsibility for both the inevitable dependent-the child or other biologically or developmentally
dependent person-and the derivative dependent-the caretaker. The institution of the family operates
structurally and ideologically to free markets from considering or accommodating dependency.");
Alstott, supra note 266, at 3 ("[F]amily law rules that establish financial relationships and liability
between individuals constitute a form of social insurance"); Rosenbury, supra note 8, at 193-94, 224-26
(2007); West, supra note 80, at 1409-10; see Halley & Rittich, supra note 7, at 758, 762-63.
485. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. I have previously relied on the connected
notions of privacy, autonomy, and liberty to organize family law as a field of study. See D. KELLY
WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxvii, xxxi
(4th ed. 2010) (setting out the casebook's theme as the tension between privacy or autonomy and state
intervention).
486. See supra notes 330-334 and accompanying text.
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model. Although family law's complexity defies reduction to a single slogan
or uniaxial policy, 487 the stark sex/no-sex divide stands out.
A recent Indiana case, In re Paternity of MF., 488 brings to life this rift.
After the mother in this case sought financial assistance for her two children,
she and the county sued to establish paternity and collect support from the
children's genetic father. The mother had conceived and given birth to both
children while in a now-ended long-term relationship with another woman. The
court treated the siblings differently because of the presumed difference in their
respective conceptions. The court issued a support order for one child because
the defendant could not prove his allegation that conception had occurred by
donor insemination, thus leaving unrebutted the presumption of sexual
intercourse followed by Indiana law. Hence, Dubay's responsibility model of
regret controls. In the same case, however, the defendant successfully fended
off the claim for support of the sibling, because for this child he produced a
semen-donor agreement and evidence that a physician had performed the
insemination, pursuant to Indiana law.489 For this child, the respect model of
K.M.H. and Ferguson governs. When the smoke clears, then, one child has a
second parent (a father) and receives state-ordered support from him, but the
sibling does not,490 with the method of conception and its proof determinative.
In turn, each sibling personifies a different paradigm of family law.
If either policy, the privatization of dependency or family self-
determination, had the theoretical traction often attributed to them, we would
expect to see movement toward harmonization. In fact, some such movement
is apparent in family law's increasing willingness in child support controversies
to recognize nontraditional families, for example, same-sex couples as legal
parents regardless of gender and genetic contribution491 and triadic parentage
487. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 7, at I (challenging the categorical distinction between the law of
the family and the law of the market); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 31, 46 (2006) (contending that family law embodies "two foundational principles: Biblical
traditionalism and liberal individualism"); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 825, 830-32 (2004) (challenging three prominent themes in family law: the story of progress
toward equality; the understanding of family law as local law, not federal law; and the separation of
family law and welfare law); Kessler, supra note 8 (noting four trends in family law resulting from the
decentering of marriage: increased emphasis on the state, increased emphasis on freedom, increased
diversity and antiessentialist approaches, and changing disciplinary boundaries).
488. J.F. v. W.M. (Inre Paternity of M.F.), 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
489. This case illustrates the evidentiary value of requiring the participation of a medical
professional in conception by donor insemination. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
490. Significantly, the court did not consider as a candidate for parentage the mother's former long-
term partner, another woman, with whom she had planned and reared the children until the relationship
dissolved. See In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d at 1257. By contrast, several other authorities would
have regarded her as a second parent with support obligations. E.g., Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005);
C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004); In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 263, at § 2.03(l) (2002) (formulating criteria for "parent[s] by estoppel" and "de
facto parent[s]").
491. See supra note 490 (citing authorities).
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collaborations492-arrangements initially facilitated by access to a menu of
reproductive options.
Yet the harmonization goes only so far, and the incongruities illustrated by
the contrasting models of regret stubbornly persist. Going forward, the policy
of privatizing dependency remains unlikely to unsettle legal rules that permit
and foster one-parent families, such as by barring single women from access to
ARTs or by requiring sperm donors to be fathers,493 while the policy of family
self-determination remains unlikely to give fathers with second thoughts the
"Roe v. Wade for men" for which they have pressed.494
This impasse, highlighted by the contrasting models of regret, suggests
that, as foundations of family law, neither the privatization of dependency nor
family self-determination can do all the work asked of them. Neither reaches
across the sex/no-sex divide.
Yet, the very sex/no-sex divide that exposes the limitations of each of these
oft-cited policies or theories also supplies the bridge. A conceptualization of
family law as, first and foremost, a system of sexual regulation helps reconcile
the divergent outcomes in the case law and the different models of regret. So
understood, family law takes aim at sex, not procreation, as the contrasting
opinions in the case studies attest. When procreative activities entail sex,
measures ensuring the privatization of dependency constitute an important form
of regulation, even if such objectives constrain family self-determination.
When procreative activities do not entail sex, family law loses this particular
regulatory interest,495 even if such inattention comes at the expense of other
important policies and values, including privatizing dependency.
Family law's often unacknowledged preoccupation with sex496 and its
imposition of sexual discipline offer a coherent explanation of the different
legal treatments emerging from the models of regret in the sex cases and the
no-sex cases. To characterize family law as a system of sexual regulation is to
make a purely descriptive claim, not a normative one. Normative projects
492. See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (recognizing three legal parents
for children in custody and support litigation); Appleton, supra note 239.
493. Talk of such legal restrictions in the wake of the notorious "Octomom," an unmarried and
unemployed woman who used ARTs to have fourteen children, including octuplets, has all but
evaporated. See, e.g., Josephine Johnston, Judging Octomom, 39 HASTINGS CENTER. REP. 23 (2009);
Kimberly Krawiec, Why We Should Ignore the "Octomom," 104 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120
(2009).
494. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
495. Finding that the state interest does not extend to particular fact patterns is reminiscent of some
of the methodology of governmental interest analysis for deciding choice of law issues. See, e.g.,
Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in BRAINERD CURRIE,
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963).
496. 1 have previously documented what I called family law's "sex-centricity." Appleton, supra
note 90, at 272-76. This analysis of regret strengthens the earlier hypothesis. See also Susan Frelich
Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. (forthcoming
2012) (on file with author) (examining "illegitimacy" through the lens of sex). I return to such topics in
a new project, Regulating Sex and Sexualities.
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building on this description might work to decenter sex in family law, 497 to give
sex a more positive valence,498 or to develop other approaches that look past fig
leaves like regret to grapple with powerful yet often hidden values and
commitments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Once we consider Gonzales v. Carhart499 as merely one in a series of cases
about reproduction and regret, the majority opinion becomes less remarkable
although no less controversial. In a range of cases, courts, including the
Gonzales majority, have treated regret as a blank page on which to express
assumptions and values about gender, sex, autonomy, and family-even while
invoking the often conflicting rhetoric of modem family law, with its emphasis
on individual decisionmaking about reproduction and other personal matters,
gender equality, privacy, and pluralism.
Although the focus on reproduction that links the cases examined in this
Article has always stood out, featuring the less noted shared element of regret
offers new insights. By developing this connection and thus viewing
Gonzales's use of regret through a wider lens, this Article makes several
contributions:
First, it identifies and examines contrasting models of reproduction and
regret, providing a contextualized understanding of regret's regulatory function.
In turn, these models emphasize the state's participation in constructing regret
as well as regret's impact in reshaping law, legal practices, and associated
personal experiences; they highlight scripts about gender and sex at work in the
different deployments of regret; and they expose regret's role in camouflaging
important doctrinal inconsistencies and policy priorities in family law. More
particularly, this Article shows how the regulation of sex belongs at the center
of family law theory, given this policy's explanatory scope and capacity.
Finally, as a methodological matter, by connecting doctrinal and rhetorical dots
across the case law, this Article challenges familiar categories and invites
explorations of other patterns that such categories so often obscure.
497. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); cf Rosenbury & Rothman, supra
note 160, at 811 (urging decoupling of sex and intimacy).
498. See Appleton, supra note 90 (urging additional attention to women's sexual pleasure in family
law); Franke, supra note 72 (critiquing legal feminists' sex-negative agenda).
499. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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